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Abstract
We study the political impact of commercial television in Italy exploiting the stag-
gered introduction of Berlusconi’s private TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s.
We find that individuals with early access to Mediaset all-entertainment content
were more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office.
The effect persists for five elections and is driven by heavy TV viewers, namely the
very young and the elderly. Regarding possible mechanisms, we find that individ-
uals exposed to entertainment TV as children were less cognitively sophisticated
and civic-minded as adults, and ultimately more vulnerable to Berlusconi’s populist
rhetoric.
Keywords: Entertainment TV, Voting, Cognitive Abilities, Civic Engagement
JEL codes: L82, D72, Z13
∗We thank Alberto Alesina, Filipe Campante, Antonio Ciccone, Stefano DellaVigna, Ruben
Enikolopov, Ray Fisman, Greg Huber, Brian Knight, Valentino Larcinese, Marco Manacorda, Torsten
Persson, Barbara Petrongolo, Andrei Shleifer, Francesco Sobbrio, Joachim Voth, David Weil, Katia Zhu-
ravskaya, and seminar participants at Bocconi, CREI, NYU, MIT, Sciences Po, Brown, Dartmouth,
Sorbonne, WZB, Surrey, Queen Mary, Yale, EIEF, LSE, Namur, Bank of Italy, Warwick, UPF, and
participants at the AEA Meetings, the EUI Conference on Communications and Media Markets, and the
Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy for helpful comments. We are very grateful to
Ben Olken and Ruben Enikolopov for their help with the ITM software. We thank Nicola D’Amelio and
Giuseppe Piraino for their assistance with data collection and Laura Litvine for her outstanding help
with the digitization of the transmitters data. Ruben Durante is grateful to the Sciences Po Scientific
Board for financial support. A previous version of this paper circulated under the title Voting Alone?
The Political and Cultural Consequences of Commercial TV.
†Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Sciences Po, and CEPR; contact: rubendurante@gmail.com.
‡Bocconi University, fRDB, CEPR, IRVAPP, and DONDENA; contact: paolo.pinotti@unibocconi.it.
§Queen Mary University, CEP (LSE), and CEPR; contact: a.tesei@qmul.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
There is extensive evidence that exposure to biased news on TV can influence viewers’
voting decisions (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikolopov et al., 2011). News programs
represent, however, just a fraction of total TV airtime,1 and other types of content may
also influence viewers’ attitudes. Indeed, previous research indicates that, by priming
particular cultural models, light entertainment shows, soap operas, and advertising can
have important and persistent effects on various types of non-political behavior, such as
civic engagement, gender attitudes, and consumption choices (Putnam, 2000; Olken, 2009;
Jensen and Oster, 2009; Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016; La Ferrara et al., 2012).2 In addition,
there is evidence that exposure to television at a young age can influence cognitive skills,
though with contrasting effects for educational and entertainment programs (Ennemoser
and Schneider, 2007; Kearney and Levine, 2015b; Christakis et al., 2004; Hancox et al.,
2005; Zimmerman and Christakis, 2007).
In this paper we show that entertainment TV can also influence political attitudes. We
study this question exploiting the staggered expansion of Silvio Berlusconi’s commercial
TV network, Mediaset, across Italian municipalities in the 1980s. In particular, we com-
pare similar municipalities that were exposed to Mediaset channels before and after 1985,
and analyze differences in voting outcomes over the following three decades. Crucially, in
the early stages of the diffusion of Mediaset, when some areas had access to the network
and others did not, Mediaset channels were entirely devoted to light entertainment and
movies; educational content was largely absent, and newscasts were only introduced in
1991, when access to the network was virtually ubiquitous. Hence, this episode provides
a unique opportunity to isolate the effect of entertainment TV content. Our empirical
analysis exploits unique data on the location and technical characteristics of Mediaset
transmitters active in 1985. These transmitters were inherited from a multitude of local
TV stations that were progressively incorporated into the network in the early 1980s,
more than a decade before Berlusconi entered politics. It is therefore unlikely that their
location was directly functional to Berlusconi’s later political ambitions. Nonetheless,
Mediaset coverage in 1985 may have been correlated with other local characteristics that
could have affected electoral outcomes in ways other than through TV. To address this
concern, following previous work by Olken (2009), we regress our outcomes of interest on
Mediaset signal strength controlling for the hypothetical signal strength in the absence
of geomorphological obstacles, for various terrain characteristics, and for electoral dis-
trict and local labor market fixed effects. Hence, we identify the effect from the residual
variation in signal strength due to idiosyncratic geographic factors within narrow areas,
1According to the 2010 CRE Video Consumer Mapping Study, Americans devote only 18.2% of their
total watching time to news, compared to 46.8% to entertainment programs and 21.8% to advertising.
2For a comprehensive survey of previous work on the social and economic impact of mass media, see
DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2016).
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which is uncorrelated with both past electoral outcomes and a wide range of municipal
characteristics.3
We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 displayed higher support
for Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, when he first ran for election in 1994, compared to
municipalities that were exposed only later on. This effect is non-negligible – about 1
percentage point – and it is precisely estimated and robust across different specifications.
In particular, we show that estimates are virtually identical when restricting the sample to
progressively smaller municipalities (up to less than 10 thousand inhabitants). Since the
political and economic return to covering such small municipalities was negligible, they
were likely exposed or non-exposed “by chance” as local TV networks (later incorporated
into Mediaset) expanded to cover larger cities.
The effect on voting for Forza Italia is also very persistent, lasting until 2008 – five
elections and almost twenty-five years after municipalities were differentially exposed to
Mediaset, and fifteen years after Berlusconi entered politics. Given that all municipalities
were progressively exposed to Mediaset by 1990 and that our coefficient captures only
the effect of a few additional years of exposure, the effect on voting behavior is quite
remarkable.
Interestingly, when the effect on Berlusconi’s party vanishes, in the 2013 elections,
we find that municipalities exposed earlier to Mediaset exhibit higher support for the
Five Star Movement (M5S), a new populist party that first ran for election in that year.
Despite clear ideological differences, the M5S shares with Forza Italia a distinctively
populist rhetoric (Jones and Pasquino, 2015). Additional evidence from individual-level
surveys confirms that voters exposed to Mediaset earlier on tend to be more receptive to
populist messages, rather than adhering to traditional right-wing values. These findings
suggest that exposure to entertainment TV made viewers more supportive of populist
movements and leaders in general, and not just of Berlusconi or the conservative camp.
To further validate our results and to explore the mechanism(s) through which enter-
tainment TV influenced political preferences, we combine information on early Mediaset
access with individual-level data on TV consumption, cognitive abilities, and social atti-
tudes. Reassuringly, we find that the effect of Mediaset is especially pronounced for heavy
TV viewers. In particular, the effect is much larger – close to 10 percentage points – for
individuals exposed either as children (below age 10) or at older ages (55 and above),
precisely the cohorts that watch the most TV.
The mechanisms through which the effect operates are, however, very different for
the two groups. For individuals first exposed to Mediaset as children, we find that en-
tertainment TV has a negative impact on cognitive abilities in adulthood, as measured
by standardized numeracy and literacy tests. Furthermore, these individuals also exhibit
3A similar approach has been used by Farré and Fasani (2013), DellaVigna et al. (2014), and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2014).
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significantly lower levels of civic engagement, as measured by interest in politics and
participation in voluntary associations. Two pieces of evidence suggest why the effect of
entertainment TV on young viewers’ cognitive and non-cognitive abilities may have trans-
lated into higher support for Forza Italia. First, we document that Berlusconi’s party was
disproportionately popular among less educated and less engaged voters, and was hence
well-positioned to benefit from the decline in cognitive skills and civic engagement in-
duced by entertainment TV. Second, based on the analysis of a large corpus of televised
interventions by Italian politicians and of party manifestos, we show that, compared to
other political leaders, Berlusconi and his party use a language that is more accessible
to less sophisticated voters. Both in terms of voter profiles and political language, we
find that a similar pattern applies to M5S and its leader Beppe Grillo. Taken together,
our findings support the view that exposure to entertainment television, particularly at
a young age, can contribute to making individuals cognitively and culturally shallower,
and ultimately more vulnerable to populist rhetoric.
Turning to individuals exposed to Mediaset at older ages we find, instead, that the
latter developed a strong attachment to the network, making them more likely to watch
news programs on Mediaset channels after these were introduced in 1991. The larger
support for Berlusconi among these cohorts could therefore be due to exposure to the
strong pro-Berlusconi bias of Mediaset newscasts (Durante and Knight, 2012; Barone et
al., 2015).
Our research contributes to the literature on the impact of mass media in three ways.
First, we show that non-informative, entertainment TV can have a tangible impact on
political preferences, and we explore possible explanations for this effect. In this respect,
our findings complement previous contributions on the effect of (biased) news content
on voting, namely the work of DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) on the effect of Fox News
on support for Republicans, and of Enikolopov et al. (2011) on the negative impact of
the independent Russian channel NTV on support for Putin. In this regard, our work is
especially related to Barone et al. (2015), who study the effect of pro-Berlusconi bias in
Mediaset news on local elections in one Italian region.
Second, our work relates to previous contributions on the effect of television on cog-
nitive abilities (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008) and civic attitudes (Putnam, 2000; Olken,
2009). In particular, our results represent an important qualification with respect to
these studies in that they isolate the effect of entertainment content on cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes, and explore the broader implications of this effect for political
preferences.4
4Our results are also in line with extensive evidence from medicine, psychology, and education on the
impact of TV on children’s cognitive and social skills, which emphasizes the difference between exposure
to age-appropriate educational content and entertainment programs, particularly fast-paced and violent
content (Anderson et al., 2001; Christakis et al., 2004; Hancox et al., 2005; Ennemoser and Schneider,
2007; Landhuis et al., 2007; Zimmerman and Christakis, 2007; Kirkorian et al., 2008; Christakis et al.,
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Last but not least, our research contributes to a growing literature, and a vast ongo-
ing public debate, on the determinants of support for populist parties around the world
(Mughan et al., 2003; Mudde, 2007; Oesch, 2008; Dippel et al., 2015). While popular
discontent with the political establishment is likely to have deep socioeconomic roots, our
findings suggest that by popularizing certain linguistic codes and cultural models, enter-
tainment television may have contributed to creating a fertile ground for the success of
populist leaders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the evolution of Italy’s political system and broadcast television industry
during the period of interest. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 presents the main findings, while
Section 6 provides additional evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The rise of commercial TV in Italy
Italian law banned private TV broadcasting until 1976, when private channels were finally
allowed to broadcast, although only at the local level.5 To circumvent this restriction,
some business groups established broadcast syndication agreements by which formally
independent local stations would simultaneously broadcast the same content across dif-
ferent local markets, mimicking the functioning of a broader network. One such network,
Canale 5, was launched by Silvio Berlusconi in 1980; the others, Prima Rete, Italia 1,
and Rete 4, were controlled respectively by the Rizzoli, Rusconi, and Mondadori pub-
lishing groups. Despite a 1981 Constitutional Court decision that deemed syndication
agreements illegal, between 1982 and 1984 Berlusconi acquired Italia 1 and Rete 4 from
his competitors and incorporated the three channels into the Fininvest holding company,
which later became Mediaset. In October 1984, district judges from Turin, Rome, and
Pescara ordered the confiscation of Mediaset transmitters for operating in violation of the
Constitutional Court’s ruling. However, the government of Bettino Craxi – leader of the
Italian Socialist Party and Berlusconi’s long-term political sponsor – intervened issuing an
emergency decree, later converted into law by Parliament, which removed all restrictions
to broadcasting at the national level.
Once assured that its dominant position would not be threatened, Mediaset acquired
new transmitters and rapidly expanded its coverage to the entire population. Until then,
Mediaset had not systematically built its own transmitters, finding it more convenient
2013).
5This ban was motivated by the argument that the state would better protect and guarantee the
impartiality, objectivity, and completeness of television service (ruling 59/1960 by the Constitutional
Court).
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to use those of the local stations it acquired. According to our data, in 1985 Mediaset
operated 1,710 transmitters and could reach about half of the population with a high-
quality signal; two years later, the number of transmitters had reached 3,800 and Mediaset
signal reached about 87% of the population (Constitutional Court, 1988). By the end of
1990, Mediaset coverage had reached 98%, comparable to the virtually universal coverage
of the state-owned TV corporation, RAI. The RAI-Mediaset duopoly was perpetuated
by a new telecommunication law, approved by the Parliament in 1990, which largely
confirmed the regulatory framework of the 1985 decree, and limited the possibility of
assigning new broadcasting licenses to other operators.6
Crucially, the Mediaset programming schedule differed dramatically from that of RAI.
Mediaset aired more hours per day, focusing particularly on light entertainment; in con-
trast, it devoted very little time to educational content, and did not introduce newscasts
until 1991. To document these differences, we digitized the daily programming schedules
of Mediaset and RAI from the online historical archive of the Italian newspaper Corriere
della Sera. We selected the first week of each month during the period 1983-1987 – when
Mediaset had only partial coverage of the Italian territory – and we classified programs
into four categories: entertainment, movies, news and information, and educational con-
tent. These four categories account for 98.3 percent of the airtime during the period of
interest.
In the left graph of Figure 1, we first look at differences in total airtime per day. From
the very beginning, Mediaset channels broadcast from the early morning through late
night – about 16 hours per day. This was a major innovation over RAI channels, which
traditionally operated only during the central hours of the day – 11 hours per day in 1983
– though there is some convergence over time. We then examine differences in the type
of programs featured on Mediaset and RAI; the right graph of Figure 1 compares the
share of airtime devoted to each category. Mediaset was almost entirely devoted to light
entertainment and movies (63% and 27% of total airtime, respectively), whereas news
and educational content was almost absent. By contrast, RAI devoted 34% of its airtime
to news and an additional 22% to educational content. In terms of time, each Mediaset
channel featured on average about 10 hours per day of entertainment and 4 hours of
movies, compared to only 3.5 and 1.5 hours on RAI. Therefore, Mediaset dramatically
expanded the offer of entertainment TV shows and movies – relative to information and
educational content.
As for the quality of programs, objective measures are available only for movies. Specif-
6In the 1980s, there were only three other channels broadcasting at the national level: TeleMontecarlo,
a foreign TV channel that reached the Italian peninsula and, for this reason, aired its TV shows in Italian;
Italia 7, which was also owned by Berlusconi; and Odeon TV. However, they attained only very incomplete
coverage of the national territory, and a combined share of total audience below 5% (Constitutional Court,
1988). The number of channels increased considerably only after the transition to digital TV in 2008
(Barone et al., 2015; Mastrorocco and Minale, Forthcoming).
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Figure 1: Total airtime per day and airtime shares for different categories of TV shows,
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Mediaset RAI
Note: The left graph plots the average total airtime per day on Mediaset and RAI channels over the period 1983-1987. The
right graph shows the average share of airtime (and associated 90% confidence intervals) devoted to different categories of
TV programs on the two networks.
ically, we collected professional critic reviews on all 2,857 movies broadcast on Mediaset
and RAI during our sample period (i.e., the first week of each month between 1983 and
1987). Some movies were screened multiple times during this period (up to 4), for a total
of 3,327 observations.7 The online databases Mymovies.it and Filmtv.it provide average
critic ratings, on a scale from 2 to 10, for 2,743 and 2,549 movies, respectively. For a sub-
set of 747 primarily U.S. movies, we were also able to identify which movies were rated
suitable for general audiences, including children, by the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA).
Figure 2 compares critic reviews and MPAA parental guidelines between movies broad-
cast on Mediaset and RAI, respectively. Mediaset movies receive on average worse critic
reviews on both websites, the difference amounting to about a third of a standard de-
viation in critic ratings (left graph). They are also less suitable for general audiences,
although the difference across all movies remains small. However, this difference increases
and becomes statistically significant when focusing on movies broadcast in the afternoon
and early evening, when children are most likely to be watching TV (right graph).
Taken together, the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 confirms that the advent of Mediaset
vastly expanded the amount of content available to TV viewers, with particular regard
to light entertainment programs. Additional evidence from movie ratings suggests that,
compared to RAI, content on Mediaset was generally of lower quality and less suitable
for younger viewers.8
7For the purposes of evaluating the average quality of programming schedules, we record multiple
screenings of the same movie as separate observations.
8All differences between Mediaset and RAI movies shown in Figures 1 and 2 are robust to controlling
for year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effect, and to clustering standard errors by date; see
Table A1 in Appendix A.
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Note: The left graph plots the average critics’ ratings received by movies broadcast on Mediaset and RAI over the period
1983-1987. The right graph shows the share of movies suitable for general audiences, including children, according to the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). 90% confidence intervals are also shown in the graphs.
2.2 The Italian Political Landscape (1994-2013)
According to several of his associates, and by his own account, Berlusconi had no intention
of entering politics until 1992-93, when an unprecedented series of corruption scandals
led to the dismantlement of the conservative coalition that had governed Italy for over
a decade, and to the transition to the so-called Second Republic. In the wake of this
political crisis, a temporary technocratic government was instituted and early elections
were called for in March 1994. Fearing the electoral victory of the left-wing Democratic
Party (PD) – the heir of Italy’s Communist Party that had traditionally been critical
of Mediaset’s dominant position and advocated a general reform of the media industry
– Berlusconi decided to run for office. In December 1993, just three months before the
elections, he announced the creation of a new political party, Forza Italia (“Forward
Italy”), which aspired to occupy the political space left by the collapse of traditional
center-right parties.9
The entry of Berlusconi revolutionized the Italian political landscape. Berlusconi’s
political message and communication style were very different from what Italian voters
were used to. His political platform was rather vague, allowing him to forge alliances with
parties as diverse as the post-fascist nationalist Alleanza Nazionale (“National Alliance”)
and the separatist Lega Nord (“Northern League”). He used simple language and catchy
slogans, easily accessible to ordinary people. He was critical of professional politicians, and
portrayed himself as a political outsider, emphasizing his achievements as a businessman.
Forza Italia’s organization also differed radically from that of traditional Italian parties:
it was essentially a personalistic party, with a minimal territorial structure and relatively
9For simplicity we refer to the “PD” and “Forza Italia” throughout, although the names of both
parties changed repeatedly over the sample period.
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few party members (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999).
Berlusconi’s innovative style and aggressive campaign proved very successful. The
right-wing coalition led by Forza Italia won the 1994 elections and Berlusconi became
Prime Minister for the first time. Although his first experience in office was short-lived,
Berlusconi had become a key player in the Italian political landscape. The right-wing
coalition would win the elections again in 2001 and 2008, and would lose by only a narrow
margin in 1996 and 2006 against the left, led by the PD. In 2013, both coalitions suffered
major losses against the Five-Star Movement (M5S), a new populist party that captured
25.5% of the votes.10
Figure 3 summarizes the timing of the events described above and illustrates the
intuition behind our empirical approach: relating electoral patterns in and after 1994
with access to Mediaset prior to 1985, when geographical differences in coverage were still
considerable.
Figure 3: Timeline of events, 1980-1994
 
1980 1985 1991 1987 1992 1994 - 2013 1990 
3 Data
We obtained from Mediaset detailed information on all the 1,710 transmitters operating
in 1985. Specifically, for each transmitter we obtained a technical report indicating the
latitude, longitude, altitude, and height of the transmitter’s location, as well as its trans-
mitting power and frequency.11 We combine this information with a high-resolution GIS
map of Italy to compute Mediaset signal strength across Italian municipalities.
Broadcast television signal is transmitted over the air according to the laws of physics
for electromagnetic propagation. In the free space, signal strength would decrease with
the square of the distance from the transmitter. However, patterns of decay are much
more complex due to diffraction caused by mountains and other obstacles. We compute
the actual signal loss employing a professional engineer-developed software based on the
10Figure A1 in Appendix A shows the vote share obtained by the main parties and coalitions in the
Second Republic.
11A sample technical report sheet is reported in Appendix A (Figure A2).
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Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (ITM). The ITM was originally developed by the
US government for frequency-planning purposes and allows to accurately predict signal
strength across narrow geographical cells (Phillips et al., 2011).12
Following Olken (2009), we compute the signal loss between each Mediaset transmitter
and each of Italy’s 8,100 municipalities (comune) using the ITM algorithm.13 For each
municipality-transmitter pair, we subtract the signal loss from the transmission power to
obtain the predicted signal strength at the receiving location, in decibels (dB). Finally,
we compute the predicted signal strength in each municipality as the maximum signal
power across all transmitters.
In principle, reception is of high quality for positive values of signal strength (i.e.,
when signal loss is lower than transmission power) and is imperfect or nil for negative
values of signal strength. Olken (2009) provides evidence in this respect for the case of
Indonesia using survey data on TV viewership; specifically, he documents that the share
of individuals able to watch a given channel is close to zero for values of signal strength
around -100 dB, it increases with signal strength, and approaches full coverage when
signal strength turns positive.
The left map in Figure 4 reports the distribution of Mediaset signal strength across
Italian municipalities in 1985. Signal strength is positive in 29% of Italian municipalities,
accounting for half of the population – not surprisingly, Mediaset covered disproportion-
ately large cities. According to the evidence in Olken (2009), this should be the population
receiving Mediaset with good signal quality in 1985.
However, the exact relationship between signal strength and the quality of reception
may vary across space and time. For instance, Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) show that,
in 1989, viewers in East Germany attained fairly good reception of Western TV channels
even for negative levels of signal strength. Data on the distribution of Mediaset viewers
in the early 1980s are unfortunately not available, so we cannot estimate the relationship
between signal strength and reception quality for the specific case of Mediaset channels.
For this reason, we follow Enikolopov et al. (2011) and exploit continuous variation in
signal strength throughout most of the analysis.14
To ease the interpretation of the results, we compute our main explanatory variable,
Signal, by dividing the original signal strength by its standard deviation. We exclude mu-
nicipalities in the top and bottom 2.5% of the signal distribution, as even large differences
in signal strength at either tail of the distribution should have little or no effect on the
12The version used in this paper is described in Hufford (2002), and has been previously used by Olken
(2009), Enikolopov et al. (2011), Farré and Fasani (2013), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), and DellaVigna et
al. (2014). We thank Benjamin Olken for kindly sharing the ITM code.
13Municipalities represent the lowest administrative units in Italy and are fairly small both in terms of
surface (mean of 37.2 km2, median of 21.8 km2) and population (mean of 7,010 inhabitants, median of
2,296 inhabitants); Table A2 in Appendix A reports summary statistics for our main variables.
14The only exception is a robustness analysis, presented in Section 5.2, in which we match neighboring
municipalities with positive and negative signal strength, respectively.
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quality of reception.
Figure 4: Mediaset signal strength and hypothetical signal strength in the free space in
1985
Note: The left map shows Mediaset actual signal strength, in decibels (dB), across municipalities in 1985. The right map
shows the hypothetical signal strength in the absence of geomorphological obstacles. The black dots represent the location
of transmitters.
The ITM also allows us to compute the hypothetical signal strength in the free space
(i.e., assuming the absence of mountains or other obstacles to electromagnetic propaga-
tion), which is important for our identification strategy. The distribution of signal strength
in the free space is shown in the right map of Figure 4. As for the actual signal strength,
we obtain the standardized signal strength in the free space, SignalFree, by dividing the
original variable by its standard deviation.
Turning to the main outcome of interest, we obtained from the Italian Ministry of Inte-
rior municipality-level data on all national elections between 1976 and 2013. Throughout
this period elections were held under a proportional electoral system, with the exception
of the 1994, 1996, and 2001 elections, which were held under a mixed system with a strong
majoritarian component (75% of the seats were assigned in first-past-the-post electoral
districts). We focus on voting for the Lower House (Camera) because the different elec-
toral system in the Upper House (Senato) encouraged the formation of joint lists, often
changing across different areas of the country.15
15For instance, in the 1994 elections Forza Italia ran together with the Lega Nord in northern regions




Estimating the effect of Mediaset on later electoral outcomes requires that signal strength
prior to 1985 is exogenous to voting behavior over the period 1994-2013. Some of the
facts discussed in section 2 suggest that this may indeed be the case. First, Mediaset
transmitters were inherited from small local stations that were progressively incorporated
into the network, hence the exact location and installed power were not chosen by Me-
diaset. Second, even if Mediaset had targeted local stations in politically strategic areas,
the considerable changes that occurred in the Italian political system between the early
1980s and 1994 (i.e., different electoral rules and different parties) would have frustrated
any such strategy. Third, Berlusconi decided to enter politics just a few months prior to
the 1994 elections, in the wake of political upheavals that were unforeseeable a decade
before. For all these reasons, it is unlikely that the geographical expansion of Mediaset
prior to 1985 was intentionally driven by the later political ambitions of Berlusconi.
However, early Mediaset coverage could still be correlated with other factors that
also influence voting behavior (e.g., proximity to large cities). Following Olken (2009),
we address this issue by regressing our outcomes of interest, across municipalities, on
actual signal strength (Signal) as well as on the hypothetical signal strength in the free
space (SignalFree). The latter variable captures variation in signal strength due to the
location and power of transmitters, so the coefficient of Signal is identified from variation
in diffraction patterns caused by topography.16
We further restrict the analysis to variation within electoral districts (EDs) and lo-
cal labor markets (LLMs). Both EDs and LLMs are very small areas (median area of
527 and 352 square kilometers, respectively) compared to provinces, the administrative
unit just above municipalities (median area of 2246 square kilometers). Therefore, our
estimates exploit only residual variation across municipalities within narrow geographical
areas characterized by similar economic and political conditions.17
Finally, topography could influence political and social outcomes in ways other than
through signal propagation. For this reason, we control for various geographic character-
istics: surface area and its square, average altitude and its square, and average terrain
ruggedness. Therefore, we do not exploit the very presence of geographical obstacles to
signal propagation for the purposes of identification but, rather, their particular shape –
arguably a milder restriction.
The following equation summarizes our econometric strategy:
V otem = βSignalm + γSignalFreem + δ
′Xm + EDi(m) + LLMj(m) + εm, (1)
16The same approach is used also by DellaVigna et al. (2014). Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) does not control
for signal strength in the free space, but includes instead polynomials in distance from the transmitters.
17LLMs are defined by ISTAT on the basis of workers’ commuting patterns (ISTAT, 2011). Figure A3
of Appendix A shows the boundaries of EDs, LLMs, and provinces, respectively.
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where V otem is the vote share obtained by a given party (e.g., Forza Italia) in munici-
pality m; Signalm and SignalFreem are, respectively, the actual signal strength and the
hypothetical signal strength in the free space; Xm is a vector of control variables, includ-
ing geographic and socio-economic characteristics; EDi(m) and LLMj(m) are, respectively,
the fixed effects for the i-th electoral district and for the j-th local labor market in which
municipality m is located; and εm is an error term. We cluster standard errors by electoral
district to allow for arbitrary correlation in error terms across municipalities facing the
same choice of candidates; however, we discuss the robustness of our results to alterna-
tive assumptions about standard errors. Finally, we weight observations by population in
1981, in order to make the estimates representative at the national level.18
The main coefficient of interest, β, captures the reduced form effect of (potential)
exposure to Mediaset – as opposed to the effect of actual viewership.19 The main iden-
tification assumption is that, conditional on the other covariates in equation (1), Signal
is independent of εm. Although such an assumption is essentially untestable, we provide
an indirect test of conditional independence by looking at the correlation of Signal with
voting patterns in the 1970s and 1980s as well as with other socio-economic conditions
that could potentially influence voting behavior.
Table 1 shows the correlation between Signal and the vote share of the main parties
and coalitions in the national elections in 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1992. We focus on
the electoral results of the Italian Communist Party, the center-right coalition Pentapartito
formed by the Christian Democrats and their allies, and a residual group comprising
other (minor) parties. The univariate coefficient of Signal is generally small and not
significantly different from zero (column 2); this is even more the case when controlling
for fixed effects and other municipality characteristics (column 3). In addition, in the
last three rows we examine the relationship between Signal and changes in parties’ vote
share between 1979 and 1983, i.e., the elections prior to the diffusion of Mediaset. Again,
regardless of the specification, we find no evidence of any significant relationship. These
results indicate that Mediaset coverage prior to 1985 is not systematically correlated with
pre-existing political preferences, or changes in such preferences.
In Table 2 we explore the correlation between Signal and other municipality character-
istics. Several factors are significantly correlated with Signal in the univariate regression
(column 2). As should be expected, the expansion of Mediaset throughout the Italian
territory was not random, targeting, instead, more economically developed areas. How-
ever, most of the correlation with these local characteristics is absorbed by the other
variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) (column 3). Indeed, the joint variation in
SignalFree, topography, and fixed effects explains between 50% and 90% of the overall
18The results on the unweighted observations are generally stronger.
19Olken (2009) and Enikolopov et al. (2011), who also have information on the number of viewers,
use signal strength as an instrument to estimate the effect of viewership in a two-stage-least-squares
framework.
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Table 1: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for the main Italian parties, 1976-1992 (balance
tests)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party, election mean univariate OLS FE & controls
coeff. R2 coeff. R2
Italian Communist Party, 1976 33.332 1.773 0.005 -0.522 0.806
(0.137) (1.157) (0.574)
Pentapartito, 1976 54.95 -0.487 0.005 0.229 0.806
(0.131) (1.068) (0.508)
Other parties, 1976 9.027 -1.013 0.007 0.263 0.915
(0.082) (1.047) (0.248)
Italian Communist Party, 1979 28.966 1.644 0.002 -0.646 0.830
(0.138) (1.165) (0.535)
Pentapartito, 1979 55.153 -0.770 0.001 0.386 0.813
(0.128) (1.105) (0.476)
Other parties, 1979 11.672 -0.487 0.009 0.223 0.912
(0.081) (1.006) (0.236)
Italian Communist Party, 1983 28.003 1.502 0.002 -0.695 0.829
(0.138) (1.212) (0.559)
Pentapartito, 1983 53.607 -0.872 0.005 0.388 0.808
(0.126) (1.166) (0.483)
Other parties, 1983 12.522 -0.285 0.020 0.288 0.902
(0.082) (0.984) (0.272)
Italian Communist Party, 1987 25.223 0.847 0.002 -0.715 0.838
(0.133) (1.140) (0.510)
Pentapartito, 1987 54.73 -1.187 0.001 0.417 0.829
(0.128) (1.225) (0.458)
Other parties, 1987 15.056 0.681 0.007 0.258 0.913
(0.088) (0.999) (0.262)
Italian Communist Party, 1992 15.171 0.410 0.000 -0.078 0.862
(0.105) (0.859) (0.365)
Pentapartito, 1992 50.586 -3.031 0.007 -0.210 0.891
(0.145) (1.562) (0.409)
Other parties, 1992 28.773 2.997 0.007 0.283 0.942
(0.136) (1.454) (0.252)
Italian Communist Party, change 1979-83 -0.963 -0.129 0.000 -0.033 0.499
(0.026) (0.140) (0.113)
Pentapartito, change 1979-83 -1.54 -0.102 0.018 -0.004 0.566
(0.038) (0.224) (0.187)
Other parties, change 1979-83 0.851 0.199 0.021 0.059 0.703
(0.029) (0.167) (0.147)
Note: The table explores the relationship between early access to Mediaset and the average vote shares of the main parties
and coalitions in each national election between 1976 and 1992, as well as the change in vote shares between the 1979 and
the 1983 elections, the last ones prior to the diffusion of Mediaset (last three rows). Column (1) reports the mean of each
variable; column (2) reports the coefficient and R2 of the univariate OLS regression of each variable on Mediaset signal
strength in 1985 (Signal) controlling for signal strength in the free space (SignalFree); column (3) adds ED and LLM fixed
effects, surface area and its square, average altitude and its square, and average terrain ruggedness. Means and regressions
are weighted by municipality population in 1981, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district
level are reported in parentheses.
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variation for most socio-economic characteristics. Once these additional covariates are
included in the regression, Signal is no longer correlated with labor market conditions,
whereas it continues to be correlated with educational attainment and income per capita.
For this reason, we include both these variables on the right-hand side of our main re-
gression. Finally, as for political variables, we also verify that early access to Mediaset is
not related to changes in basic demographic and economic conditions in the pre-Mediaset
years. In this respect, regardless of the specification, we find no significant correlation be-
tween Signal and changes in population, number of firms, and number of firms’ employees
between 1971 and 1981.
Table 2: Exposure to Mediaset and municipality characteristics (balance tests)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable: mean univariate OLS FE & controls
coeff. R2 coeff. R2
Population, thousands (1981) 6.936 68.164 0.249 8.983 0.999
(0.579) (63.342) (7.446)
Population, thousands (change 1981-2001) -0.713 -0.963 0.020 -0.159 0.994
(5.258) (6.111) (0.653)
Log income per capita, thousand euros (1985) 1.738 0.110 0.039 0.025 0.913
(0.024) (0.035) (0.008)
Higher education, percentage (1981) 13.183 1.411 0.144 0.723 0.833
(0.708) (0.690) (0.234)
Voluntary associations X 100 inhabitants (1981) 0.103 -0.001 0.032 0.003 0.497
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Activity rate, percentage (1991) 42.258 2.535 0.047 0.137 0.858
(0.220) (0.278) (0.151)
Employment rate, percentage (1991) 35.074 3.155 0.021 0.135 0.953
(0.419) (0.564) (0.160)
Unemployment rate, percentage (1991) 6.936 -0.855 0.005 -0.121 0.791
(0.202) (0.357) (0.173)
Firms per 1,000 inhabitants (1981) 50.927 0.765 0.043 -0.046 0.724
(1.125) (1.256) (0.653)
Firms per 1,000 inhabitants (change 1971-81) 10.182 0.441 0.023 0.062 0.570
(0.553) (0.838) (0.530)
Firms’ employees, thousands (1981) 78.1 27.163 0.195 2.594 0.999
(34.715) (25.878) (2.169)
Firms’ employees, thousands (change 1971-81) 2.717 -1.434 0.096 0.111 0.998
(4.019) (2.883) (0.095)
Note: The table reports the mean of municipality characteristics (column 1) and their correlation with early exposure
to Mediaset (columns 2-3). Specifically, column (2) reports the coefficient and R2 of the univariate OLS regression of
each variable on Mediaset signal strength in 1985 (Signal) controlling for signal strength in the free space (SignalFree);
column (3) adds ED and LLM fixed effects, surface area and its square, average altitude and its square, and average terrain
ruggedness. Means and regressions are weighted by municipality population in 1981 (with the exception of mean population




This section presents the main results of our empirical analysis. We first estimate the
effect of early exposure to Mediaset in 1985 on voting in and after 1994 across municipal-
ities. We then investigate the mechanisms driving this relationship exploiting additional
information from several surveys available at the individual level.
5.1 Baseline estimates
In Table 3 we examine the effect of Mediaset signal strength in 1985 on voting for Forza
Italia in 1994 – the first election in which Berlusconi ran for office. In the univariate
regression in column (1), Signal displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient:
a one standard deviation increase in Signal is associated with a 2.85 percentage point
increase in the vote share of Forza Italia.
In columns (2) and (3) we add to the right-hand side the hypothetical signal strength
in the free space (SignalFree) and the measures of topography. If anything, the coeffi-
cient of Signal increases slightly, suggesting that our main result holds when we exploit
only idiosyncratic variation in signal strength driven by geographic obstacles between
the municipality and the transmitter. The point estimate on Signal decreases to slightly
less than 1 percentage point when including ED and LLM fixed effects (column 4). Af-
ter controlling for these sets of fixed effects, the coefficient remains virtually unaffected
when adding income per capita (in log), schooling levels, and number of eligible voters
to the specification (column 5). It is also unaffected when estimating the regression on
unweighted observations (column 6) and when capping the top and bottom 2.5% of values
of the variable Signal rather than trimming the sample (column 7). In all regressions
in Table 3, standard errors are clustered by electoral district. However, the coefficient
on Signal remains equally significant when i) clustering standard errors by local labor
market, ii) using two-way clustering by both electoral district and local labor market, and
iii) allowing for spatial correlation in error terms applying Conley’s (1999) approach and
using different reference distances (see Appendix Table A3).20
The baseline estimate in column (5) of Table 3 captures the effect of a few additional
years of exposure, because by 1990 virtually all municipalities had access to Mediaset. To
provide a better sense of the magnitude, we first approximate coverage in each year by
fitting a logistic curve through Mediaset expansion over time, as available from our own
data and from the Constitutional Court (1988).21 Integrating the logistic curve between
1980 and 1990, municipalities reached before and after 1985 were exposed on average for
7 and 4 years, respectively. Assuming that the effect increases linearly with the length
20We implement Conley’s (1999) approach in Stata using the acreg ado file coded by Colella et al.
(2018), which allows for the use of population weights.
21The predicted coverage of Mediaset in each year is shown in Figure A4 of Appendix A.
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Table 3: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for Forza Italia in 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
baseline regression no weights winsor.
Signal 2.853 3.215 3.666 0.901 0.851 0.976 0.729
(0.860) (0.705) (0.759) (0.232) (0.234) (0.193) (0.218)
SignalFree -0.289 0.014 -0.668 -0.642 -0.396 -0.433
(0.719) (0.473) (0.260) (0.254) (0.202) (0.234)
Area (100s sq. Km) -0.966 0.854 0.875 0.540 0.780
(0.695) (0.380) (0.404) (0.335) (0.408)
Area2 0.030 -0.079 -0.069 -0.033 -0.043
(0.054) (0.093) (0.093) (0.084) (0.095)
Altitude (ths.) -6.244 -12.716 -10.963 -9.675 -9.771
(4.483) (1.578) (1.625) (1.373) (1.619)
Altitude2 -0.092 7.125 6.367 5.259 5.239
(3.953) (1.269) (1.290) (1.218) (1.256)
Ruggedness 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Electorate (ths.) -0.004 0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Log income per capita (ths. Euros) 5.109 4.760 5.017
(0.763) (0.614) (0.743)
Education (% high-school + college) -0.089 -0.108 -0.093
(0.030) (0.032) (0.029)
Observations 7,600 7,600 7,590 7,590 7,519 7,519 7,898
Electoral district FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Local labor market FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.109 0.919 0.921 0.765 0.920
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of Forza Italia in the
1994 elections. The main explanatory variable, Signal, is Mediaset signal strength in 1985, SignalFree is signal strength in
the free space. Area, Altitude, Area2, and Altitude2 are the municipality’s surface (in squared meters) and average altitude
(in thousand meters) and their respective squared terms; Ruggedness is the municipality’s average terrain ruggedness;
Electorate is the number of eligible voters in the municipality, in thousands; Log income per capita is the logarithm of
per capita income in 1985; Education is the share of municipality population with at least a high-school diploma. The
specifications in columns (4)-(7) also include ED and LLM fixed effects. All regressions except column (6) are weighted
by municipality population in 1981. In column (7) we winsorize Signal rather than trimming the sample like in the other
specifications. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported in parentheses.
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of exposure – a non-trivial assumption – the effect-per-year-of-exposure is 0.85/3=0.28
percentage points. Projecting such an effect on the average years of exposure across the
entire population between 1980 and 1990 (5 and a half years), the voting share of Forza
Italia would have decreased by 0.28 × 5.5 = 1.54 percentage points in the absence of
entertainment TV during the 1980s.
This effect is quite sizable for at least three reasons. First, the effect of differential
exposure before 1985 likely fades away with time, so it is indeed remarkable that there
are still systematic differences in voting in 1994 (and even later; see below). Second, all
municipalities were equally exposed to Mediaset entertainment and biased news content
since 1991. Finally, our coefficient captures only the “intention-to-treat” effect, so the
average effect across viewers would be even larger.
To gauge the magnitude of the effect in terms of parliamentary representation, we
estimate the number of seats that Berlusconi’s coalition would have lost in first-past-the-
post districts. Assuming that the effect estimated on the vote share of Forza Italia brings
an opposite effect on the largest competing coalition, we find that absent entertainment
TV the Centre-Right would have lost 18 seats in 1994 (out of 463 for which the two main
coalitions competed). Replicating the analysis for the other two elections held under first-
past-the-post electoral systems, the effect increases up to 61 seats in 1996 and 40 seats in
2001. To this, we should add the effect on the seats assigned via the proportional ballot,
which, however, is hard to gauge due to the complexity of the electoral rule.
5.2 Robustness
To exclude that the gap in voting for Berlusconi reflects other (omitted) differences
between exposed and non-exposed municipalities, we perform the following robustness
checks. First, we restrict the sample to progressively smaller municipalities – up to less
than 10,000 inhabitants. The political and economic return to covering such municipali-
ties would be negligible, so they were likely exposed or non-exposed “by chance” as local
TV stations that were later incorporated into Mediaset expanded to cover larger towns.
The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) reproduces the baseline estimate on
the entire sample (as in column 5 of Table 3); column (2) drops all province capitals (104
cities); and columns (3) to (5) progressively exclude municipalities with more than 100,
50, and 10 thousand inhabitants, respectively. The coefficient is virtually unaffected, even
when restricting to very small towns with less than 10 thousand inhabitants; see also the
left graph in Figure 5.
Second, we match pairs of neighboring municipalities that share a similar hypothetical
signal strength in the free space but were nevertheless differently exposed to Mediaset.
Specifically, we compare voting patterns between any two neighboring municipalities, i
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Table 4: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for Forza Italia in 1994, robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
baseline only smaller municipalities matching neighbors
estimate no prov. cap. pop.≤100k pop.≤50k pop.≤10k ∆ ≤ 1 ∆ ≤ 0.5 ∆ ≤ 0.25
Signal 0.851 0.817 0.763 0.817 0.880 0.584 0.750 0.834
(0.234) (0.226) (0.231) (0.232) (0.219) (0.161) (0.188) (0.229)
Observations 7,519 7,415 7,474 7,397 6,582 4,548 3,229 2,071
R-squared 0.921 0.894 0.895 0.884 0.829 0.854 0.840 0.818
Note: This table compares the estimated effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of Forza Italia in the 1994
elections within different sub-samples. Column (1) reproduces the baseline regression in column (5) of Table 3. Columns
(2) to (5) restrict the sample to progressively smaller municipalities – indicated on top of each column. Columns (6)
to (8) include in the sample only pairs of neighboring municipalities such that |SignalFreei − SignalFreej | < ∆ and
Signalj < 0 ≤ Signali, for different values of ∆ – indicated on top of each column. All regressions control on the right-
hand side for all municipality-level variables reported in column (5) of Table 3, namely SignalFree, Area, Altitude, Area2,
Altitude2, Ruggedness, Electorate, Log income per capita, Education. Regressions in columns (1) to (5) control in addition
for ED and LLM fixed effects; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level are reported
in parentheses. Regressions in columns (6) to (8) control instead for neighbor-pair fixed effects (each municipality can
appear in more than one pair); heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
and j, such that
|SignalFreei − SignalFreej| < ∆ and Signalj < q ≤ 0 ≤ Signali, (2)
for different values of ∆ and q.22 To the extent that negative values of Signal entail
imperfect or nil reception, as shown by Olken (2009), such comparison approximates in
a very intuitive fashion the ideal experiment of exposing to Mediaset only one of two
otherwise identical municipalities. The last three columns of Table 4 show the estimated
difference in voting for q = 0 and ∆ lower than 1, 0.5, and 0.25, respectively, controlling for
all municipality-level variables as well as for neighbor-pair fixed effects (each municipality
can appear in more than one pair). As we reduce the bandwidth, exposed and non-
exposed municipalities are indistinguishable in terms of all (observable) characteristics
and previous voting behavior.23 Even within this smaller sub-sample, the coefficient of
Signal remains positive and statistically significant; indeed, it is virtually identical to the
baseline OLS estimate on the total sample.
As an additional robustness check, we further restrict the sub-sample to pairs of neigh-
boring municipalities with similar SignalFree and in which one municipality has positive
signal and the other one has signal below some level q < 0 (see the second condition in
equation 2). As we decrease q, we are comparing exposed municipalities with municipal-
ities experiencing progressively worse reception. The right graph in Figure 5 shows that
the gap in voting for Berlusconi remains statistically significant (in spite of the large drop
22Since Signal and SignalFree are measured in terms of standard deviations of the original signal
strength and signal strength in the free space, respectively, q and ∆ are defined using the same metrics.
23The balance tests are reported in Tables A4 and A5 of Appendix A.
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in sample size) and it increases in magnitude as we decrease q.24 To the extent that the
probability of watching Mediaset decreases with signal loss, this evidence is also consis-
tent with the observed differences in voting across matched municipalities being driven
by exposure to Mediaset.
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Note: This figure compares the estimated effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of Forza Italia in the 1994
elections within different sub-samples. The left graph shows the coefficient of Signal (and associated confidence intervals)
from the baseline regression in column (5) of Table 3, when restricting the sample to progressively smaller municipalities
– indicated on the horizontal axis. The right graph shows the coefficient of Signal (and associated confidence intervals)
from the regression in column (8) of Table 4 (i.e., including in the sample only pairs of neighboring municipalities such that
|SignalFreei − SignalFreej | ≤ 0.25 and Signalj < q ≤ 0 ≤ Signali) for different values of q – indicated on the horizontal
axis. Both graphs also show (on the right vertical axis) the sample size in each regression.
Overall, the estimates reported in Table 4 and Figure 5 are virtually identical to the
baseline OLS estimates in Table 3. For this reason, in the rest of the paper we only report
OLS estimates across all municipalities.
5.3 Other parties and elections
In Table 5 we report the results for all elections and parties. Each entry in the table
reports the OLS estimated effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of a
party (rows) in a given election (column), using the same specification as in column (5) of
Table 3. Though the political landscape changed quite frequently after 1994, we were able
to identify six other parties (or blocks of parties) that run for office alongside Forza Italia
in all or some of the elections: other parties in the center-right coalition; centrist parties;
the Democratic Party; other parties in the center-left coalition; extreme left parties; and
the M5S (only for 2013).
The positive effect on Forza Italia persists for five elections, vanishing only in 2013.
Interestingly, in that year municipalities that were exposed to Mediaset earlier on show
24The graph considers the most restrictive matching for ∆ ≤ 0.25. The evidence is similar when
considering the larger bandwidths, ∆ ≤ 1 and ∆ ≤ 0.50, see the Appendix Figure A5.
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Table 5: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for main political parties (1994-2013)
Party ↓ Election → 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013
Forza Italia
0.851 0.713 0.832 0.945 1.021 0.198
(0.234) (0.200) (0.296) (0.281) (0.337) (0.273)
Others centre-right
0.082 0.006 -0.121 0.034 -0.194 -0.091
(0.361) (0.318) (0.218) (0.204) (0.144) (0.088)
Centrist parties
-0.183 -0.239 -0.186 -0.002 -0.237 0.079
(0.264) (0.158) (0.197) (0.147) (0.168) (0.136)
Democrat Party
-0.407 -0.473 -0.422 -0.483 -0.644 -0.421
(0.376) (0.327) (0.285) (0.372) (0.342) (0.271)
Others centre-left
-0.183 -0.041 -0.075 -0.265 -0.027 -0.103
(0.124) (0.151) (0.196) (0.233) (0.108) (0.094)
Extreme left
-0.322 -0.227 -0.204 -0.212 -0.105 -0.219




0.027 0.129 0.134 0.003 0.142 0.050
(0.198) (0.092) (0.097) (0.073) (0.177) (0.179)
Invalid ballots
0.134 0.132 0.043 -0.020 0.044 -0.015
(0.128) (0.136) (0.171) (0.049) (0.087) (0.069)
Turnout
0.338 0.488 0.369 0.260 0.212 0.512
(0.334) (0.392) (0.394) (0.256) (0.231) (0.251)
Note: The table shows the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of the main Italian parties
(rows) in each of the six elections held between 1994 and 2013 (columns). Each entry in the table reports
the estimated coefficient (and standard error) of Signal from the baseline regression in column (5) of Table
3. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses.
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significantly higher support for the newborn M5S – the only party beside Forza Italia to
display a positive and significant coefficient.25
Interestingly, Forza Italia and M5S have very different ideological stances. Although
the M5S can hardly be located on the traditional right-left axis, it is generally perceived as
leaning towards the left of the political spectrum; by contrast, Berlusconi always catered
to center-right voters.26 At the same time, both parties are characterized by a distinctively
populist rhetoric; indeed, they are often cited as leading examples of populist European
parties (see, e.g. Van Kessel, 2015; Jones and Pasquino, 2015; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016).
A potential reconciliation of the effect on Forza Italia and M5S is, thus, that higher
support for Forza Italia reflects widespread populist attitudes (as opposed to a different
ideological stance) among viewers exposed earlier to entertainment TV.
5.4 Entertainment TV, populism, and right-wing values
In Table 6 we explore the effect of exposure to Mediaset on voters’ political preferences
using individual-level data from the Italian National Election Study (ITANES), an on-
going survey conducted immediately before and after all Italian national elections since
1972. Each wave covers a representative sample of the Italian population – between
2,000 and 3,000 individuals – and includes detailed information on (self-reported) politi-
cal preferences, media consumption, and a range of individual characteristics such as age,
gender, education, and employment.27 Crucially, the data also include information on the
municipality of residence (1,878 in total), which allows us to assign to each respondent
a value of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985. We can thus compare the effect of early
exposure to Mediaset on political preferences for different groups of individuals. We in-
clude in the sample all individuals interviewed in every wave conducted between 1994
and 2013. All specifications include on the right-hand side the variables Signal, Signal-
Free, all municipality-level control variables in column 5 of Table 3, gender and age of
the respondent, and province and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level in all regressions.
The dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy for having voted Forza Italia in
the previous election. The results of the individual-level analysis confirm those at the
municipal level. Early exposure to Mediaset has a positive and statistically significant
effect on voting for Forza Italia. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in pre-
1985 signal intensity is associated with an increase in the probability of an individual
25The effect on M5S is unaffected when controlling for access to broadband Internet, which previous
research by Campante et al. (2013) shows was positively related with support for the M5S; see Table A6.
26Figure A6 of Appendix A shows the ideological stance of Forza Italia, the Democratic Party, and the
M5S, as perceived by respondents of the Italian National Elections Study (described in the next section).
Noticeably, more than one third of respondents are unable to locate the M5S on the left-right axis (as
opposed to less than 10% for the other two parties), consistent with the party’s ideological ambiguity.
27The ITANES survey is described in detail in Bellucci and Maraffi (2008). It has been used, among
others, by Bellucci and Heath (2012), Durante and Knight (2012), and Barone et al. (2016).
22
voting for Forza Italia of almost 3 percentage points – an even larger effect than that
estimated across municipalities. This estimate is also very stable when restricting the
sample to smaller municipalities, see the first graph in Figure 7.
Table 6: Exposure to Mediaset and Political Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Populist attitudes Right-wing values
Voting for “Politics is “Politicians only “Immigrants “Abortion should “Same-sex couples “Common-law
Forza Italia too complicated” want your vote” steal jobs” be made more should have marriages should
difficult” same rights” be recognized by law”
Signal 0.028 0.023 0.063 0.043 0.016 0.020 -0.019
(0.012) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
Sample average [0.31] [0.80] [0.70] [0.46] [0.43] [0.59] [0.77]
Observations 10,565 6,388 6,551 7,903 8,756 4,784 4,213
R-squared 0.094 0.049 0.159 0.073 0.110 0.110 0.101
Note: The table illustrates the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on individual political preferences, using survey data
from various waves of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) conducted between 1994 and 2013. The dependent
variable in column (1) is a dummy equal to 1 for having voted for Forza Italia in the previous election; in columns (2) to
(7) it is a dummy equal to 1 for individuals agreeing with the statements indicated on top of each column. The sample
average of all dependent variables is reported in square brackets. The main explanatory variable, Signal, is Mediaset signal
strength in 1985. All regressions also include on the right-hand side the following municipal controls: SignalFree, Area,
Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Log income per capita, Education and Population 1981 ; plus province and election year fixed
effects, and Age and Gender of the respondent. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses.
In the remaining columns of Table 6 we further characterize the effect of early exposure
to entertainment TV on political preferences exploiting additional information included
in ITANES. Early Mediaset viewers sympathize with typical populist messages, such as
“Politics is too complicated”, and “Politicians only want your vote” (columns 2 and 3,
respectively). They are also more likely to believe that “Immigrants steal jobs from
natives” (column 4). While the latter political stance is common to both populist and
right-wing parties, early Mediaset viewers are not more likely to support traditional right-
wing values: opposition to abortion, same-sex marriages, and common law marriages
(columns 5-7).
Overall, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that entertainment TV made viewers more
receptive to populist propaganda – rather than more supportive of Berlusconi or, more
generally, the conservative camp.
6 Mechanisms
We next investigate which categories of viewers were more deeply affected, and through
which mechanisms.
6.1 Effects by age
Intuitively, early exposure to Mediaset should have a greater impact on individuals spend-
ing more time watching TV. The survey on leisure time use conducted by ISTAT in 1983
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contains detailed information on media consumption by a representative sample of the
Italian population (ISTAT, 1986). The age profile of TV viewers is U-shaped, with chil-
dren, youth, and retirees spending more hours watching TV than adults between 25 and
55; see the left graph in Figure 6.28
We then classify individuals in the ITANES survey by their age in 1985, using the
same age categories as the ISTAT time use survey, and estimate the effect of exposure
to Mediaset separately for each age group. The specification is identical to that used in
Table 6, i.e., controlling for SignalFree, all municipality-level variables included in column
(5) of Table 3, province and election fixed effects, and age and gender of the respondent.
The right graph in Figure 6 shows that the effect of Mediaset is larger and statistically
significant for individuals exposed in very young or old age – i.e., below 10 and 55 and
above, respectively – whereas there is no significant effect on the other age cohorts. This
is consistent with children and retirees comprising the highest fraction of heavy TV con-
sumers, defined as those watching at least 5 hours of TV per day. Indeed, TV consumption
and Mediaset effects exhibit the same age profile in Figure 6.
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Effect of Mediaset on voting, by age
Note: The left graph depicts the share of heavy TV viewers (i.e., watching 5 hours or more of TV per day) and the average
number of hours of TV per day for the same age groups. The right graph shows OLS estimates (and associated confidence
intervals) of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the probability of voting for Forza Italia by age group, using the
same classification as in Table A7. The OLS specification is the same as in column (1) of Table 6.
The results by age group also provide important insights into the extreme persistence
of the effect of entertainment TV. Indeed, the average effect of Mediaset on the probability
of voting for Forza Italia across all individuals – 2.9 percentage points – is entirely driven
by the large effect on younger and older cohorts – 7.8 and 9.8 percentage points, respec-
tively. The former group includes individuals below 10 in 1985, who would join the voting
population starting in 1994 and who would gradually replace the older cohorts, leaving
28The results of the survey are summarized in Appendix Table A7. In the 1980s the retirement age in
Italy was between 55 and 60 for most categories of workers.
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the overall share of voters influenced by Mediaset largely unchanged. Indeed, these two
cohorts account together for about 20 percent of voting population since 1994.29
6.2 Discussion of potential mechanisms
We explore three possible mechanisms through which entertainment TV may have in-
fluenced the political preferences of early Mediaset viewers and their attitudes towards
Berlusconi’s party or toward populist parties more generally.
The first possibility is that exposure to entertainment TV may have negatively affected
children’s cognitive abilities, making them more vulnerable to populist rhetoric as adults.
This hypothesis is consistent with evidence that less educated voters are more likely to
support populist parties (Arzheimer, 2009). A large literature in medicine, psychology,
education, and, more recently, in economics has investigated the effect of television on
children’s cognitive development. While a number of studies indicate that exposure to TV
at young ages is associated with attention problems, delayed language development, and
lower educational attainment (Christakis et al., 2004; Landhuis et al., 2007; Chonchaiya
and Pruksananonda, 2008; Hancox et al., 2005), evidence in this regard is not uncon-
troversial. For example, a prominent study by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) finds that
access to television in the U.S. in the 1950s had a positive although moderate effect on
children’s standardized test scores. Importantly, the effect of TV seems to vary consid-
erably depending on the type of content. While exposure to age-appropriate educational
programs can be beneficial for cognitive development and school attainment, entertain-
ment programs, particularly fast-paced and violent ones, tend to have the opposite effect
(Anderson et al., 2001; Ennemoser and Schneider, 2007; Zimmerman and Christakis, 2007;
Kirkorian et al., 2008; Christakis et al., 2013; Hernæs et al., 2017; Kearney and Levine,
2015a).30 Consumption of entertainment TV would be detrimental because it crowds out
other more cognitively challenging activities such as reading, studying, or role-playing,
as well as media consumption of educational material (Williams, 1985, 1986; Shin, 2004;
Hernæs et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2017).
The second hypothesis is that consumption of entertainment TV at early ages may have
contributed to making individuals less socially engaged and civic-minded, for example by
crowding out more socially engaging collective activities. This argument was popularized
by Putnam (2000) in his seminal work on the decline of civic engagement in the United
States, and is consistent with evidence from other disciplines of the negative impact of
29Appendix B shows the evolution of the age distribution of voters since 1994 and the implied effects
on voting for Forza Italia using administrative data provided by the Istituto Cattaneo, an independent
research center in Italy.
30Comprehensive surveys of the literature on the risks associated with excessive consumption are avail-
able from Schmidt and Vandewater (2008) and Anderson and Pempek (2005). Similar evidence of the
detrimental effects of early exposure to TV, has motivated the American Association of Pediatrics (2001)
to recommend parents to “limit children’s total media time (with entertainment media) to no more than
1 to 2 hours of quality programming per day”.
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exposure to television on social skills (Mistry et al., 2007; Christakis et al., 2013) and social
capital (Olken, 2009). Putnam also draws an important distinction between informative
and non-informative content: while news and educational programs are likely to foster
viewers’ civic engagement and political awareness, entertainment TV would have the
opposite effect.31 Less engaged voters, in turn, are more likely to be attracted to populist
parties with personalistic leadership than to parties relying on the active participation
of their members (Mazzoleni et al., 2003). In light of this argument, and of the marked
differences in TV content between Mediaset and public channels documented in Section
2.1, early exposure to Mediaset should have favored populist parties such as Forza Italia
and the M5S over more traditional mass parties like the PD.
Finally, early Mediaset viewers may have simply been more likely to know who Berlus-
coni was when he first ran for office, or they may have been more sympathetic towards
him out of gratitude for the unprecedented entertainment opportunities offered by his TV
channels.
6.3 The effect of entertainment TV on cognitive skills and civic
attitudes
We investigate empirically the mechanisms described above using psychometric tests from
military service records on the universe of Italian conscripts; adult literacy and numeracy
tests from the OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
(PIAAC); and political and civic attitudes from ITANES.
With regard to military records, until 2005 military service was compulsory in Italy
and all males turning 18 were required to complete a thorough physical and psycholog-
ical examination assessing their suitability for military service. The psychological test,
which was partly based on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (a standard-
ized psychometric test used to elicit individual personality traits, see e.g. Hathaway and
McKinley, 1951), produced a measure of “general intelligence” ranging between 1 and 7.
Individuals scoring 1 or 2 were deemed unfit for the army and exempted from service.
We obtained access to restricted-use data on all conscripts born between 1973 and 1978.
These individuals were 7-12 years old in 1985, such that they largely correspond to the
first age group in Table A7 and Figure 6. The data also include the municipality of
residence – which we use to match respondents with Mediaset signal strength in 1985.32
In Table 7 we investigate the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the general
31More recently, Aarts and Semetko (2003) and Prior (2005) show that watching entertainment TV
is correlated with lower political knowledge and participation. The impact of entertainment television
on socio-political engagement has also been examined in the literature on political communication (see
Delli Carpini, 2012, for a survey of the most relevant contributions).
32These data were assembled by Peracchi and Arcaleni (2011) to investigate the evolution of physical
characteristics of young Italian men. We are extremely grateful to Peracchi and Arcaleni for sharing their
data with us.
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intelligence score (columns 1 and 2) and on the probability of being exempted due to
receiving a low general intelligence score (columns 3 and 4). The baseline specification in
the odd columns replicates that used for the individual-level regressions in Figure 6 (i.e.,
controlling for age, the baseline set of municipal characteristics, and for province fixed
effects).33 Conscripts exposed to entertainment TV during childhood perform worse on
psychometric tests compared to their peers who were not exposed, though the effect is
relatively small (column 1). However, the increase in the probability of being exempted is
substantial: +0.2 percentage points, or 8 percent of the baseline (column 3). Therefore,
early exposure to entertainment TV is particularly detrimental for individuals in the
bottom part of the distribution of general intelligence score. Since, in this case, the
sample is extremely large, we can also exploit variation within narrower geographical
areas, namely local labor markets. When we do so, the estimates increase considerably
(even columns). Overall, the evidence in Table 7 suggests that exposure to entertainment
TV during childhood increases the probability of receiving very low scores on psychometric
tests by 8 to 25 percent over the baseline.
Table 7: Exposure to Mediaset as a child and adult cognitive skills
(1) (2) (3) (4)
general intelligence score exempted (score = 1 or 2)
Signal -0.023 -0.045 0.002 0.006
(0.012) (0.018) (0.001) (0.002)
Sample average [5.09] [5.09] [0.024] [0.024]
Province FE YES NO YES NO
Local labor market FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,360,036 1,360,023 1,360,036 1,360,023
R-squared 0.052 0.059 0.034 0.041
Note: The table illustrates the effect of of being exposed to entertainment TV as a child on adult
cognitive skills, as measured by psychometric tests partly based on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (Hathaway and McKinley, 1951). The tests were administered to all Italian males at the time
of military conscription (i.e., turning 18 or a few years older). The sample includes all conscripts born
in the period 1973-1978. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is a “general intelligence” score
ranging between 1 and 7; the dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is a dummy equal to 1 for individuals
exempted from service for scoring particularly low (1 or 2). The sample average of all dependent variables
is reported in square brackets. The main explanatory variable, Signal, is Mediaset signal strength in
1985. All regressions also include on the right-hand side all municipal controls reported in Table 6,
province or LLM fixed effects (odd and even columns, respectively), plus Age. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality-age cohort level in parentheses.
We obtain qualitatively similar results using alternative measures of cognitive devel-
opment available from the OECD-PIAAC survey on adults’ proficiency in literacy and
numeracy (see Schleicher, 2008, for a description). In Italy, the survey was conducted in
2012 on a sample of 4,598 individuals, representative of the adult population between 16
33In principle, military examination was compulsory upon turning 18. Nevertheless, around 2% of
conscripts in our data are one or a few years older than 18.
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and 65 years of age. This is a relatively small sample compared to the universe of military
conscripts in Table 7. On the other hand, it allows to estimate the effect on individuals –
both males and females – exposed to Mediaset at very different ages. In addition, PIAAC
scores in literacy and numeracy provide a more standard measure of cognitive skills than
military entry tests.
We obtained access to a restricted-use version of the data that includes information
on the municipality of residence – which we use to match respondents with Mediaset
signal strength in 1985 – as well as age, gender, and other individual characteristics. In
columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 we regress the PIAAC scores in numeracy and literacy
on Mediaset signal strength in 1985. The specification is identical to that used for the
individual-level regressions in Table 6 and Figure 6 (i.e., controlling for age, gender, the
baseline set of municipal characteristics, and for province fixed effects). Each row in
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficient from a separate regression on the subsample of
individuals in a given age group, following the same classification as in Table A7 and Figure
6 (age in 1985 is reported in the first column of the table).34 We find that adults first
exposed to Mediaset at very young ages (i.e., below 10) perform significantly worse both in
numeracy and literacy. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in Mediaset signal
strength reduces numeracy and literacy test scores by about one fourth and one fifth of
a standard deviation, respectively. We find no significant effect on cognitive achievement
of individuals exposed at later ages.
Early exposure to Mediaset has a similar effect on civic engagement, as measured by
the ITANES survey. Specifically, the dependent variable in column (3) of Table 8 is a
dummy for being fairly or very interested in politics, and the dependent variable in column
(4) is a dummy for being a member of any voluntary association, including political parties,
unions, or cooperatives; these are also the main measures of civic engagement considered
by Putnam (2000). The effect is again negative only for individuals that were first exposed
during childhood, the magnitude being also similar to the effect on cognitive skills, i.e.,
about a fifth of a standard deviation.
All individual-level results on cognitive skills and civic engagement in Tables 7 and 8
are unaffected when restricting to smaller municipalities, see Figure 7. In Appendix D we
provide additional evidence regarding the effect on civic engagement using census data
on the number of voluntary associations in 1981, 1991, and 2001.
Overall, these results suggest that early exposure to entertainment TV led to a de-
crease in cognitive sophistication and civic engagement, but only for individuals exposed
during childhood. This is consistent with extensive evidence in economics, neurosciences,
and developmental psychology that early childhood is a critical period for the develop-
34Since the survey was conducted in 2012 on individuals below 65 years of age, the oldest cohort of
respondents was born in 1947. This restricts the age categories for PIAAC to individuals who were at
most 38 in 1985.
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Table 8: Exposure to Mediaset at different ages and adult cognitive skills, civic engage-
ment, and TV news consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PIAAC ITANES
Numeracy Literacy Interest in Membership of News on
score score politics associations Mediaset
Below 10
-16.820 -12.560 -0.147 -0.105 0.038
(7.570) (7.390) (0.048) (0.049) (0.064)
Age 10-24
-2.390 -0.790 0.008 0.013 0.032
(5.570) (5.160) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Age 25-44
-2.170 -1.920 0.020 -0.038 0.006







Sample average [252.9] [256.4] [0.355] [0.355] [0.389]
Note: The table examines the effect of being exposed to entertainment TV at different ages (rows) on various
individual outcomes in adulthood (columns). The age groups follow the same classification as in Table A7
and refer to age in 1985. The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all respondents to the Italian module of
the OECD’s Program for the International Assessment of Adults Competencies (PIAAC) survey, conducted
in 2012. The dependent variables are the scores obtained in the numeracy (column 1) and literacy (column
2) part of the PIAAC tests. The sample in columns (3) to (5) includes individuals interviewed in the context
of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) surveys conducted between 1994 and 2013. The dependent
variables are binary indicators for whether the respondent reported being interested in politics (column 3),
participating in any kind of voluntary associations (column 4), and watching news on Mediaset channels
(column 5). The sample average of all dependent variables is reported (in square brackets) at the bottom of
the table. Each entry reports the estimated coefficient (and corresponding standard error) of Signal from
a regression including province fixed effects, all municipal controls reported in Table 6, and Gender and
Age of the respondent. The specifications in columns (3) to (5) also control for election year fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
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Note: These graphs show the estimated effect of Signal on individual-level outcomes (and associated confidence intervals)
when restricting the sample to progressively smaller municipalities – indicated on the horizontal axis.
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ment of cognitive skills and personality traits (see, e.g., Heckman, 2006). The similarly
large effect of early exposure to Mediaset for the older cohorts (55+ in 1985) seems in-
stead driven by a higher probability of watching Mediaset newscasts after these were
introduced in 1991. This result is shown in column (5) of Table 8, where the depen-
dent variable is a dummy for watching news primarily on Mediaset. Early exposure to
Mediaset increases the probability of watching Mediaset newscasts after 1991 by 16.6
percentage points among individuals who were 55 or older in 1985. The larger support
for Forza Italia among these cohorts could therefore be attributed to their exposure to
the markedly pro-Berlusconi bias of Mediaset newscasts (documented by Durante and
Knight, 2012).
To summarize, the evidence presented thus far confirms that entertainment TV influ-
enced the voting behavior of individuals exposed at very young or older ages. However,
the two groups were affected in very different ways: while younger cohorts experienced a
decline in cognitive abilities and civic engagement, older cohorts were hooked on Mediaset
and later exposed to biased news content on the same channels.
6.4 The effect of cognitive skills and civic engagement on voting
We next examine the implications of a decline in cognitive abilities and civic engagement
– potentially favored by exposure to entertainment TV, particularly at a young age –
for voting behavior across parties. Intuitively, parties that cater to less educated and
less civic-minded voters should benefit from the introduction of Mediaset. Therefore, the
effect of entertainment TV on voting for a given party should be inversely related to the
effects of cognitive skills and civic engagement on voting for the same party. To test this
implication, we re-estimate our baseline equation (1) separately for each party, including
both the share of population with higher education (an imperfect proxy for cognitive
skills) and the number of voluntary associations per capita on the right-hand side of the
equation. Both variables are measured in 1981 (i.e., prior to the expansion of Mediaset).
The equation is estimated pooling together all elections and including year fixed effects.
The results are reported in Figure 8, in which we plot the coefficients of Signal on
voting for each party against the corresponding coefficients for education (left graph) and
for the number of voluntary associations (right graph). Both graphs display a strong
negative relationship. This indicates that parties that fare worse among more educated
and civic-minded voters – namely, Forza Italia and M5S – are precisely those that gained
the most from the advent of Mediaset, while parties with higher support among these
groups – notably the PD – were disadvantaged.35
35The estimated coefficients of interest and standard errors are reported in the top panel of Table
A8 of Appendix A. In the bottom panel of the table we also interact Signal with both education and
civic engagement, as the evidence in Figure 8 could alternatively be explained by heterogeneous effects of
entertainment TV across municipalities with different levels of education and civic engagement. However,
the interaction coefficients are generally non-significant, such that the relationship between the effect of
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Note: The figure illustrates the relationship between the effect of exposure to Mediaset (and associated confidence intervals)
and the effects of education and civic engagement, respectively, on support for the main parties of the Second Republic.
In particular, the left and right graphs plot the coefficient of Signal (vertical axis) against, respectively, the coefficients of
schooling levels and civic engagement in 1981 (horizontal axis). The coefficients are obtained from estimating equation (1)
separately for each party, pooling together results of all elections and including year fixed effects.
6.5 Additional evidence from political discourses
One reason populist leaders may be particularly appealing to less sophisticated voters
is because they use a language that is more direct and easier for ordinary citizens to
understand (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014).36
We test whether Berlusconi’s communication style is indeed more accessible than that
of other Italian politicians using text data from two sources: party manifestos and TV
debates. Party manifestos are issued by political parties to communicate their electoral
platform to voters, and have been widely used to infer parties’ ideological positions (Gabel
and Huber, 2000). We obtained from the Manifesto Project Database the electoral man-
ifestos of all main parties running in Italian general elections since 1983, for a total of
34 manifestos (reported in Table A11) and a corpus of almost 650,000 words. We then
coded the texts in terms of their language simplicity using the Gulpease Index (GI), which
adapts the Flesch-Kincaid Index of readability to the Italian language (Flesch, 1948; Kin-
caid et al., 1975; Tonelli et al., 2012). In particular, the GI is an inverse function of the
average length of sentences and words, and ranges from 0 (minimum readability) to 100
(maximum readability).
While electoral manifestos are widely used in political analyses, other forms of political
communication may be more appropriate for our purposes. Specifically, communication
Mediaset and the effects of education and civic engagement is unaffected when allowing for interaction
effects; see Figure A7 in Appendix A.
36Some authors have even defined populism as a communication style, a “communication frame that
appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to speak in their name” (Jagers and Walgrave,
2007). For a survey of the most relevant contributions on the political communication of European
populist parties see Aalberg et al. (2016).
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style in TV appearances may be more relevant for explaining differences in voting between
individuals differentially exposed to Mediaset. For this reason, we transcribed a large
corpus of televised interventions by the main Italian political leaders during all electoral
campaigns of the Second Republic. Appendix E describes the criteria used to select TV
appearances, and the final list of interventions used in our analysis (Table A12). The
corpus comprises 43 televised interventions by 16 politicians, for a total of over 55 hours
of footage and 320,000 spoken words. The main drawback of this alternative source is
that we cannot rely on the GI, as the latter heavily depends on punctuation that is partly
arbitrary in transcriptions of spoken language. We therefore assessed the simplicity of
the language used by each politician based on the share of “simple” words, as defined by
De Mauro and Vedovelli (1980), over other (i.e., non-simple) words.
In Table 9 we regress our two linguistic indexes on a dummy equal to one for Forza
Italia, across all parties and elections over the period 1994-2013. Forza Italia and its leader
adopt a much simpler communication style than the other parties and leaders. According
to the baseline specification (columns 1 and 4), differences amount to half of a standard
deviation in the GI and one standard deviation in spoken language simplicity, respectively.
These estimates are only slightly affected when controlling for year fixed effects (columns
2 and 5) and for a dummy for right-wing parties (columns 3 and 6). Indeed, ideology does
not seem to matter for politicians’ communication style: the coefficient of the dummy
for right-wing parties is not statistically significant and small in magnitude. Instead,
communication style is most similar between Berlusconi and the populist leader of the
M5S; see the additional evidence in Figure A9 of Appendix E. The M5S is also the only
other party attracting votes from individuals that were exposed earlier to entertainment
TV (Table 5). These last findings dovetail nicely with the results in Table 6 on the relative
importance of populist attitudes and ideology for explaining our results.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that a more accessible commu-
nication style may be partly responsible for the greater support of early Mediaset viewers
for Berlusconi (and, to a lesser extent, for other populist leaders).
6.6 Additional mechanisms
The results presented thus far suggest that early exposure to entertainment TV influenced
political preferences through an impoverishment of cognitive skills and civic engagement
(for younger cohorts) and through later exposure to biased news (for older cohorts). We
next move to our third hypothesis, namely that early Mediaset viewers were more likely
to know Berlusconi when he first ran for office and they were more sympathetic towards
him.
To investigate this possibility, we exploit additional survey data on Berlusconi’s popu-
larity. We estimate the same baseline specification as in column (1) of Table 6. Our first
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Table 9: Readability of party manifestos and communication styles in TV debates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party manifestos TV debates
Gulpease Index % of commonly used words
Forza Italia 5.962 5.260 5.212 2.465 2.319 3.263
(1.319) (1.593) (2.019) (0.816) (0.613) (0.989)
Right-wing 0.065 -1.250
(1.426) (1.158)
Observations 34 34 34 37 37 37
n. of words 648,357 648,357 648,357 290,014 290,014 290,014
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
R-squared 0.260 0.467 0.467 0.261 0.545 0.565
Note: The table shows differences in the communication style of Berlusconi and its party, Forza Italia,
compared to the other political leaders and parties in Italy. The dependent variable in columns (1) to
(3) is the Gulpease Index, a standard measure of text readability, computed on the electoral manifestos
issued by the main Italian parties before all general elections since 1983. The dependent variable in
columns (4) to (6) is the share of commonly used words used by the main Italian politicians in relevant
TV appearances since 1989 (Appendix E provides additional details). The main explanatory variable is a
dummy equal to 1 for the electoral manifestos issued by Forza Italia (columns 1-3) and TV appearances
of Berlusconi (columns 4-6). Specifications in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include year fixed effects,
and specifications (3) and (6) also include a dummy for right-wing parties and leaders, respectively.
Observations are weighted by the number of words in each party manifesto and TV debate, respectively,
and the total number of words is reported at the bottom of the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
data source is a poll conducted by Italian pollster SWG in 1993 – before Berlusconi even
entered politics – in which respondents were asked to identify up to two individuals that
“had done most for Italy”. A fairly high share of respondents (13.3%) indicated Berlusconi
as one of their choices, but there is no correlation with better access to Mediaset in 1985;
see column (1) of Table 10. In the remaining columns of the table, we exploit information
about knowledge and perceptions of Berlusconi available from some waves of the ITANES
survey. More than 90% of respondents already knew of Berlusconi when he first entered
politics in 1994; most importantly, there are no significant differences between areas with
earlier or later access to Mediaset. The subsequent waves of the survey include questions
about specific qualities (e.g., honesty, sincerity, or statesmanship). We find little evidence
that early Mediaset viewers were more likely to evaluate Berlusconi more positively: of
the six coefficients in columns (3) to (8), only one is significantly different from zero.
The effect on the overall rating of Berlusconi, on a scale between 1 and 10, is also not
significantly different from zero (column 9).
These findings seem to exclude that early Mediaset viewers had either better knowledge
of Berlusconi or a better opinion about him. Indeed, “name recognition” hardly played
any role in the elections after 1994, when Berlusconi became Italy’s best known politician.
Also, better opinions about Berlusconi would be hard to reconcile with the positive effect
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of early exposure to Mediaset on voting for the M5S, which has traditionally been very
critical of Berlusconi’s conduct.
Overall, we conclude that early Mediaset viewers did not idealize Berlusconi’s qualities
as either a man or a politician. Rather, they appear to filter such qualities through a
different system of values, presumably influenced by their prior exposure to Mediaset.
This is also consistent with the fact that they later abandoned Berlusconi, but remained
nevertheless receptive to the propaganda of another populist leader.
Table 10: Exposure to Mediaset and opinions about Berlusconi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Done most for Don’t know Qualified Honest Coherent Sincere Trustworthy Statesman Rating
Italy (1993) him (1994) [1-10]
Signal 0.075 -0.001 0.010 0.001 -0.046 -0.031 0.045 -0.029 0.076
(0.068) (0.017) (0.030) (0.017) (0.042) (0.042) (0.026) (0.043) (0.068)
Sample average [0.132] [0.094] [0.619] [0.352] [0.626] [0.581] [0.518] [0.629] [5.37]
Observations 519 2,556 4,761 7,766 2,632 2,551 4,840 2,630 13,584
Note: The table illustrates the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on knowledge and opinions about Berlusconi. The sample
used in column (1) includes individuals surveyed in the context of a poll conducted by SWG in 1993. For the remaining
columns the sample includes individuals interviewed in the context of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) surveys
conducted between 1994 and 2013. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent mentioned Berlusconi
as one of the public figures who had done most for Italy in 1993 (column 1), a dummy for whether the respondent did
not know who Berlusconi was (column 2), a dummy for whether the respondents believed Berlusconi to posses a specific
quality (columns 3 to 8), and the overall rating on a 1-10 scale (column 9). The sample average of all dependent variables is
reported in square brackets. Each entry reports the estimated coefficient (and corresponding standard error) of Signal from
a regression including province fixed effects, election year fixed effects, all municipal controls reported in Table 6, and Gender
and Age of the respondent. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
7 Conclusion
How does television affect viewers’ political preferences? While much research has focused
on the political impact of news content, the possibility that exposure to entertainment
programs may also shape political attitudes remains largely unexplored.
We examine this question by studying the consequences of the introduction of com-
mercial television in Italy in the 1980s. We find that areas with early access to light
entertainment TV channels prior to 1985 displayed higher vote shares for Berlusconi’s
party, Forza Italia, in 1994, when he first ran for office. This effect is quite sizable
(about 1.5%), it persists over five elections, and is more pronounced for individuals first
exposed to entertainment TV at young ages. Regarding possible mechanisms, we show
that individuals exposed to entertainment TV as children became both less cognitively
sophisticated and less civic-minded as adults, and hence potentially more vulnerable to
Berlusconi’s rhetoric. In line with this explanation, the political effect of entertainment
TV extends to another party, the Five-Star Movement (M5S), that shares with Forza
Italia a distinctively populist rhetoric. Indeed, both parties are especially popular among
less educated and less civic-minded voters.
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Our findings offer the first systematic evidence that exposure to entertainment tele-
vision influences voting behavior, and suggests that this effect is mediated by deeper
cognitive and cultural transformations. Although specific to the Italian case, our analy-
sis provides more general insights into how cultural codes popularized by entertainment
media can influence political preferences.
36
References
Aalberg, Toril, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Stromback, and
Claes De Vreese, Populist political communication in Europe, Routledge, 2016.
Aarts, Kees and Holli A Semetko, “The divided electorate: Media use and political
involvement,” Journal of Politics, 2003, 65 (3), 759–784.
American Association of Pediatrics, “Children, adolescents, and television,” Pedi-
atrics, 2001, 107 (2), 423–426.
Anderson, Daniel R. and Tiffany A. Pempek, “Television and Very Young Chil-
dren,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2005, 48 (5), 505–522.
Anderson, DR, AC Huston, K Linebarger Schmitt, and DLy Wright
Linebarger, “Early Childhood Television Viewing and Adolescent Behavior: The Re-
contact Study,” Monographs of the society for Research in Child Development, 2001, 66
(1), 264.
Arzheimer, Kai, “Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe,
1980–2002,” American Journal of Political Science, 2009, 53 (2), 259–275.
Barone, Guglielmo, Alessio D’Ignazio, Guido de Blasio, and Paolo Naticchioni,
“Mr. Rossi, Mr. Hu and politics. The role of immigration in shaping natives’ voting
behavior,” Journal of Public Economics, 2016, 136, 1–13.
, Francesco D’Acunto, and Gaia Narciso, “Telecracy: Testing for channels of
persuasion,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2015, 7 (2), 30–60.
Bellucci, Paolo and Marco Maraffi, “ITANES-The Italian National Election Study
series,” Italian Political Science, 2008, 1.
and Oliver Heath, “The structure of party-organization linkages and the electoral
strength of cleavages in Italy, 1963–2008,” British Journal of Political Science, 2012,
42 (01), 107–135.
Bursztyn, Leonardo and Davide Cantoni, “A tear in the iron curtain: The impact
of Western television on consumption behavior,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
2016, 98 (1), 25–41.
Campante, Filipe, Ruben Durante, and Francesco Sobbrio, “Politics 2.0: The
multifaceted effect of broadband internet on political participation,” Journal of the
European Economic Association, 2013.
37
Canovan, Margaret, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy,”
Political studies, 1999, 47 (1), 2–16.
Carpini, Michael X Delli, “Entertainment media and the political engagement of
citizens,” The SAGE handbook of political communication, 2012, pp. 9–21.
Chonchaiya, Weerasak and Chandhita Pruksananonda, “Television viewing asso-
ciates with delayed language development,” Acta Paediatrica, 2008, 97 (7), 977–982.
Christakis, Dimitri A, Frederick J Zimmerman, David L DiGiuseppe, and
Carolyn A McCarty, “Early television exposure and subsequent attentional problems
in children,” Pediatrics, 2004, 113 (4), 708–713.
, Michelle M Garrison, Todd Herrenkohl, Kevin Haggerty, Frederick P
Rivara, Chuan Zhou, and Kimberly Liekweg, “Modifying media content for
preschool children: a randomized controlled trial,” Pediatrics, 2013, 131 (3), 431–438.
Clair, Ralf St., “A different slice of PIAAC: Alternative insights from the survey results,”
in “2014 CASAE Annual Conference” 2014.
Colella, Fabrizio, Rafael Lalive, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Mathias Thoenig,
“Inference with Arbitrary Clustering,” mimeo, University of Lausanne, 2018.
Conley, Timothy G, “GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence,” Journal of
econometrics, 1999, 92 (1), 1–45.
Constitutional Court, “Sentenza n. 826/1988 del 13-14 Luglio 1988,” Technical Report
1988.
DellaVigna, Stefano and Eliana La Ferrara, “Media and Social and Economic Out-
comes,” in Simon Anderson, Joel Waldfogel, and David Stromberg, eds., Simon Ander-
son, Joel Waldfogel, and David Stromberg, eds., Elsevier, 2016.
and Ethan Kaplan, “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2007, 122 (3), 1187–1234.
, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhu-
ravskaya, “Cross-border media and nationalism: Evidence from Serbian radio in Croa-
tia,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2014, 6 (3), 103–132.
Dippel, Christian, Robert Gold, and Stephan Heblich, “Globalization and Its
(Dis-)Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior,” Working Paper 21812, National
Bureau of Economic Research December 2015.
38
Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight, “Partisan Control, Media Bias, And Viewer
Responses: Evidence From Berlusconi’s Italy,” Journal of the European Economic As-
sociation, 05 2012, 10 (3), 451–481.
Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Media and
political persuasion: Evidence from Russia,” The American Economic Review, 2011,
101 (7), 3253–3285.
Ennemoser, Marco and Wolfgang Schneider, “Relations of television viewing and
reading: Findings from a 4-year longitudinal study.,” Journal of Educational Psychol-
ogy, 2007, 99 (2), 349.
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Appendix A Additional tables and figures
Table A1: Programming schedules, Mediaset vs. RAI 1983-1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
total share of total airtime critics’ reviews MPAA parental
airtime entert. movies news educat. Mymovies Filmtv all day primetime
Mediaset 3.896 0.354 0.132 -0.183 -0.281 -0.548 -0.538 -0.025 -0.070
(0.087) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.055) (0.065) (0.032) (0.037)
Constant 12.420 0.123 0.184 0.238 0.404 5.699 6.652 0.133 0.181
(0.138) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.131) (0.172) (0.076) (0.084)
Observations 9,512 2,378 2,378 2,378 2,378 3,205 2,990 863 523
R-squared 0.541 0.610 0.248 0.367 0.654 0.041 0.035 0.026 0.058
Note: This table compares Mediaset and RAI programming schedules during the first week of each month over the period
1983-1987 by the means of OLS regressions on a dummy equal to 1 for Mediaset channels. The dependent variables in
columns (1) and (2)-(5) are, respectively, the total airtime per day, in hours, and the share devoted to each type of program
on each channel-day (6 channels × 7 days × 12 months × 5 years = 2,378 observations). The dependent variables in
columns (6) and (7) are the professional critics’ ratings received by movies broadcast on the two networks on the websites
Mymovies.it and Filmtv.it. Finally, the dependent variable in the last two columns is a dummy equal to 1 for movies suitable
for general audiences, including children, according to the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Column (8)
includes all movies broadcast over the period, while column (9) movies broadcast in the afternoon and prime-time hours. All
regressions include year, calendar month, and day of the week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by day are reported
in parentheses.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
unweighted sample weighted by population in 1981
obs. mean st.dev. median obs. mean st.dev. median
Actual signal strength in 1985 8010 -55.708 124.258 -32.466 7988 -6.821 104.577 -0.196
Signal strength in the free space 8010 -3.163 57.542 -13.684 7988 20.727 66.415 12.101
Signal (standardized signal strength) 8010 -0.388 1.000 -0.230 7988 0.010 0.830 0.014
SignalFree (std. signal strength in the free space) 8010 -0.055 1.000 -0.238 7988 0.360 1.154 0.210
Population in 1981 (ths.) 7988 7.061 45.654 2.317 7988 302.19 684.30 24.44
Surface area (100s sq. Km) 8010 0.372 0.500 0.217 7988 1.559 2.832 0.629
Altitude (ths. mt.) 8010 0.352 0.291 0.288 7988 0.180 0.210 0.112
Ruggedness 8000 218.50 209.44 161.80 7978 126.99 146.67 69.75
Electorate in 1994 (ths.) 8010 6.04 36.05 2.07 7988 239.01 548.47 21.80
Log of income per capita 7913 1.619 0.298 1.674 7908 1.729 0.300 1.768
Education, % higher education in 1981 7988 8.538 3.448 8.128 7988 13.261 5.857 12.035
Voluntary associations X 100 inhabitants, 1981 7584 0.099 0.134 0.056 7584 0.103 0.085 0.087
A1








1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013
Centre-right Centre-left Other Parties m5s
Table A3: Full baseline specification adjusting for spatial correlation in error terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One-way clustering 2-way clustering Spatially-corrected standard errors (Conley, 1999)
District LLM Distr. & LLM 10km 20km 30km 40km 50km 60km
Signal 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
(0.234) (0.223) (0.211) (0.197) (0.215) (0.246) (0.245) (0.235) (0.243)
Observations 7,519 7,519 7,495 7,482 7,482 7,482 7,482 7,482 7,482
Note: This table investigates the robustness of our baseline regression to different assumptions about the correlation of
residuals across observations. Column (1) reproduces the baseline regression in column (5) of Table 3, with standard errors
clustered by electoral district. Column (2) cluster residuals by local labor markets, while column (3) allows for two-way
clustering on both dimensions. Columns (4) to (9) allow for spatial correlation in error terms applying Conley’s (1999)
approach and using different values of the reference distance.
A2
Figure A2: Example of a technical report sheet for one of the Mediaset transmitters active
in 1985
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Figure A3: Electoral districts, local labor markets, and provinces
Figure A4: Estimated expansion of Mediaset coverage, 1980-1990
year coverage change in coverage from t-1 to t
1980 0
/b1 98.56829 1981 0.022438 0.022438 treated
/b2 0.966215 1982 0.05686 0.034422 6.98





































Table A4: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for the main Italian parties, 1976-1992 (bal-
ance test, matching estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party, election mean matching neighbors
∆ ≤ 1 ∆ ≤ 0.5 ∆ ≤ 0.25
Italian Communist Party, 1976 33.332 -0.489 -0.362 -0.305
(0.137) (0.331) (0.360) (0.418)
Pentapartito, 1976 54.95 0.249 0.141 0.043
(0.131) (0.324) (0.357) (0.409)
Other parties, 1976 9.027 0.290 0.221 0.229
(0.082) (0.108) (0.127) (0.147)
Italian Communist Party, 1979 28.966 -0.415 -0.386 -0.276
(0.138) (0.309) (0.330) (0.383)
Pentapartito, 1979 55.153 0.341 0.318 0.243
(0.128) (0.320) (0.353) (0.404)
Other parties, 1979 11.672 0.053 0.040 0.059
(0.081) (0.124) (0.148) (0.165)
Italian Communist Party, 1983 28.003 -0.459 -0.471 -0.364
(0.138) (0.321) (0.353) (0.402)
Pentapartito, 1983 53.607 0.462 0.596 0.490
(0.126) (0.328) (0.366) (0.417)
Other parties, 1983 12.522 0.130 0.025 0.115
(0.082) (0.137) (0.161) (0.197)
Italian Communist Party, 1987 25.223 -0.674 -0.615 -0.470
(0.133) (0.305) (0.335) (0.379)
Pentapartito, 1987 54.73 0.484 0.497 0.451
(0.128) (0.308) (0.340) (0.386)
Other parties, 1987 15.056 0.173 0.126 0.096
(0.088) (0.130) (0.142) (0.169)
Italian Communist Party, 1992 15.171 -0.421 -0.475 -0.401
(0.105) (0.231) (0.264) (0.316)
Pentapartito, 1992 50.586 0.455 0.434 0.571
(0.145) (0.287) (0.327) (0.363)
Other parties, 1992 28.773 -0.100 -0.023 -0.162
(0.136) (0.182) (0.213) (0.240)
Italian Communist Party, change 1979-83 -0.963 -0.034 -0.067 -0.089
(0.026) (0.152) (0.180) (0.191)
Pentapartito, change 1979-83 -1.54 0.109 0.261 0.247
(0.038) (0.173) (0.208) (0.219)
Other parties, change 1979-83 0.851 0.079 -0.015 0.056
(0.029) (0.092) (0.105) (0.122)
Note: The table reports the average vote shares obtained by the main parties and coalitions in each election
between 1976 and 1992 (column 1) and their correlation with early exposure to Mediaset (columns 2-4).
Specifically, columns (2), (3), and (4) compare vote shares between neighboring municipalities that differ in
SignalFree by less than 1, 0.5, and 0.25, respectively, with one municipality having Signal above zero and
the other one having Signal below zero. We form a sample of such neighbor-pairs and regress vote shares on
Signal, controlling for neighbor-pair fixed effects (since each municipality can appear in more than one pair)
and for terrain characteristics. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are reported in parentheses.
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Table A5: Exposure to Mediaset and municipality characteristics (balance tests, matching
estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable: mean matching neighbors
∆ ≤ 1 ∆ ≤ 0.5 ∆ ≤ 0.25
Population, thousands (1981) 6.936 3.431 2.789 1.911
(0.579) (1.956) (2.700) (1.686)
Population, thousands (change 1981-2001) -0.713 -0.045 -0.185 -0.182
(5.258) (0.163) (0.232) (0.154)
Log income per capita, thousand euros (1985) 1.738 0.008 0.004 0.003
(0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Higher education, percentage (1981) 13.183 0.378 0.123 0.011
(0.708) (0.131) (0.138) (0.158)
Voluntary associations X 100 inhabitants (1981) 0.103 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Activity rate, percentage (1991) 42.258 0.137 0.057 0.081
(0.220) (0.114) (0.130) (0.155)
Employment rate, percentage (1991) 35.074 -0.074 -0.143 -0.146
(0.419) (0.112) (0.126) (0.148)
Unemployment rate, percentage (1991) 6.936 -0.017 -0.050 0.003
(0.202) (0.123) (0.146) (0.168)
Firms per 1,000 inhabitants (1981) 50.927 -1.726 -2.391 -1.431
(1.125) (0.605) (0.728) (0.927)
Firms per 1,000 inhabitants (change 1971-81) 10.182 -0.985 -1.230 -0.670
(0.553) (0.549) (0.675) (0.903)
Firms’ employees, thousands (1981) 78.1 1.289 1.216 0.778
(34.715) (0.747) (1.099) (0.714)
Firms’ employees, thousands (change 1971-81) 2.717 -0.045 -0.161 -0.077
(4.019) (0.086) (0.122) (0.081)
Note: The table reports the mean of municipality characteristics (column 1) and their correlation with early exposure to
Mediaset (columns 2-4). Specifically, columns (2), (3), and (4) compare variables between neighboring municipalities that
differ in SignalFree by less than 1, 0.5, and 0.25, respectively, with one municipality having Signal above zero and the other
one having Signal below zero. We form a sample of such neighbor-pairs and regress each municipality characteristic on
Signal, controlling for neighbor-pair fixed effects (since each municipality can appear in more than one pair) and for terrain
characteristics. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.
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coefficient and std. error. sample size (right axis)
|SignalFree(i)-SignalFree(j)| 1
Note: This figure shows the coefficient of Signal (and associated confidence intervals) when including in the sample only
pairs of neighboring municipalities such that |SignalFreei − SignalFreej | ≤ ∆ and Signalj < q ≤ 0 ≤ Signali, for
different values of q – indicated on the horizontal axis. The left and right graph show the results for ∆ = 0.5 and ∆ = 1,
respectively. All regressions control on the right-hand side for all municipality-level variables in column (5) of Table 3,
namely SignalFree, Area, Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Ruggedness, Electorate, Log income per capita, Education, and for
neighbor-pair fixed effects (each municipality can appear in more than one pair). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. Observations are weighted by municipality population in 1981. Both graphs also
show (on the right vertical axis) the sample size in each regression.

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Unable to locate
ideological position, as perceived by ITANES respondents (1=Left, 10=Right)
Democratic Party M5S Forza Italia
Note: The figure reports the perceived ideological stance of Forza Italia, the M5S, and the Democratic Party, as reported
by respondents of the ITANES survey.
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Table A6: Exposure to Mediaset and voting for M5S (robustness to controlling for broad-
band Internet)
(1) (2) (3)




Years with full access 0.078
(from 2005 to 2010) (0.032)
Observations 7,519 7,482 7,482
R-squared 0.866 0.868 0.867
Note: The table shows the effect of exposure to Mediaset on voting for the M5S controlling
for broadband Internet access. In column (2) we control for the average share of households
in the municipality with access to broadband Internet (via ADSL) between 2005 and 2010.
The measure is defined on an asymmetric 6-point scale ranging from 0 (0%) to 5 (above 95%).
In column (3) we control for an alternative measure of broadband access, i.e., the number of
years, from 2005 to 2010, during which 95% or more of the households in the municipality
had access to Internet; this measure ranges from 0 (no full access in 2010) to 6 (full access in
2005). All regressions also include on the right-hand side SignalFree, all municipal controls
reported in column (5) of Table 3, ED and LLM fixed effects. Observations are weighted by
municipality population in 1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in
parentheses.
Table A7: TV consumption in 1983
Hours of TV per day Average
≤ 2 hours 3-4 hours 5+ hours num. hours
All sample (51,012 individuals) 0.39 0.47 0.15 2.86
Panel A: by gender, education, and employment condition
Females 0.35 0.48 0.16 2.99
Males 0.42 0.45 0.12 2.72
High school dropout 0.36 0.48 0.16 2.95
High school or college 0.49 0.42 0.09 2.48
Not employed 0.28 0.51 0.21 3.27
Employed 0.50 0.43 0.08 2.43
Panel B: by age of the respondent
Children (below 10) 0.27 0.51 0.22 3.30
Youth (10-24) 0.33 0.51 0.16 3.06
Adults (25-44) 0.45 0.45 0.10 2.61
Pre-retirees (45-54) 0.45 0.43 0.12 2.66
Retirees (55 or above) 0.37 0.45 0.17 2.96
Note: The table summarizes information from a survey on the use of time by Italian households conducted by the Italian
National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) in 1983, which included a set of questions on media consumption. The first 3 columns
report the share of individuals in each group (rows) watching a given number of hours of TV per day. The average number
of hours in column (4) is approximated by attributing 1 hour to individuals reporting up to 2, 3.5 hours to those reporting
3 to 4, 5.5 hours to those reporting 5 to 6, and 7 hours to those reporting 6 or more. Source: ISTAT (1986).
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Table A8: The effects of Mediaset, education, and social capital on voting






Italia others Party others Left parties
Signal 0.672 -0.162 -0.065 -0.386 -0.134 -0.202 0.522 0.086
(0.227) (0.192) (0.110) (0.280) (0.095) (0.103) (0.243) (0.071)
Education -0.174 -0.086 0.070 0.128 0.084 0.042 -0.175 0.014
(0.040) (0.041) (0.014) (0.035) (0.010) (0.013) (0.030) (0.014)
Social Capital -1.819 -1.392 0.414 2.904 -0.069 0.862 -1.421 -0.167
(0.669) (0.492) (0.308) (0.758) (0.244) (0.338) (0.594) (0.186)
R-squared 0.716 0.831 0.657 0.853 0.691 0.721 0.866 0.444
Including additional interaction terms
Signal 1.134 -0.119 -0.210 -0.360 -0.388 -0.023 1.619 -0.082
(0.389) (0.344) (0.178) (0.453) (0.305) (0.170) (0.413) (0.192)
Education -0.049 0.001 0.020 -0.016 0.026 -0.016 -0.111 0.018
(0.036) (0.035) (0.017) (0.040) (0.026) (0.016) (0.040) (0.017)
Social Capital -0.249 -0.525 -0.341 1.071 0.176 -0.361 -1.059 0.086
(1.002) (0.655) (0.442) (1.148) (0.438) (0.502) (0.824) (0.282)
Signal X Education -0.178 -0.086 0.072 0.126 0.086 0.041 -0.186 0.015
(0.041) (0.042) (0.014) (0.035) (0.010) (0.013) (0.030) (0.014)
Signal X Social Capital -1.927 -1.547 0.327 3.212 0.002 0.744 -1.803 -0.129
(0.726) (0.522) (0.329) (0.862) (0.230) (0.353) (0.654) (0.171)
R-squared 0.716 0.831 0.657 0.853 0.691 0.721 0.867 0.444
Observations 45,105 45,105 45,105 45,105 45,105 45,105 7,519 45,105
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of education, social capital, and early exposure to Mediaset on the
vote share of the main Italian parties – reported on top of each column – between 1994 and 2013. Signal is Mediaset
signal strength in 1985, Education is the share of people with secondary or tertiary education, and Social Capital is the
number of voluntary associations for every 100,000 inhabitants. The regressions in the bottom panel also interact Signal
with Education and Social Capital. All regressions pool together the results of all elections between 1994 and 2013, and
include on the right-hand side SignalFree, Area, Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Ruggedness, Electorate, Log income per capita,
and election, ED and LLM fixed effects. Observations are weighted by municipality population in 1981. Standard errors
clustered at the electoral district level are reported in parentheses.
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Effect of education on voting for party X
Party-specific effects of Mediaset and civicness
Note: The figure replicates the analysis in Figure 8 after interacting Signal with education and civic engagement. In
particular, the left and right graphs plot the coefficient of Signal (vertical axis) against, respectively, the coefficients of
schooling levels and civic engagement in 1981 (horizontal axis). The coefficients are obtained by estimating equation (1)
separately for each party, including in addition interactions of Signal with education and civic engagement. All specifications
pool together results of all elections and include year fixed effects.
Appendix B Age composition of voting population
and persistence of the Mediaset effect
To relate the persistence of the effect of Mediaset to the age composition of the voting
population, we use individual data on electoral participation available from administrative
records. Specifically, we use data from the Turnout Archive assembled by the ITANES-
Cattaneo Institute. The dataset includes individual data on all registered voters for a
representative sample of 100 ballot stations over the period 1994-2006 (which includes
four national elections). Each station includes on average 550 voters, until 1998, and
800 voters, after 1998, for a total of 55,000 and 80,000 individuals respectively. The
longitudinal dimension of the data makes it possible to follow the same electors over
time. Crucially, the dataset also includes information about each individual’s personal
characteristics - including age, gender, education, and profession - which allows us to follow
the evolution of electoral participation for different socio-demographic groups. Figure A8
shows the age distribution of the electorate in each election between 1994 and 2006.
Using these data, we explore the relationship between the persistence of the effect
of Mediaset and the size of the two most affected groups, namely younger and older
viewers. Indeed, while the average effect of Mediaset on the probability of voting for
Forza Italia across all individuals is 2.9 percentage points, it is 7.8 percentage points for
younger viewers (aged 10 or less in 1985), and 9.8 percentage points for older viewers
(aged 55 or more in 1985). One possible explanation for the persistence of the effect over
two decades is that younger cohorts, who joined the voting population in or after 1994,
progressively replaced the older ones who were gradually exiting, thus leaving the overall
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share of voters affected by Mediaset largely unaffected. Weighting the estimated effect
of Mediaset for each of these age groups by their relative size in the voting population,
in Table A9 we compute the implied effect of Mediaset in each election between 1994
and 2006. The table shows that, together, young and old viewers account for roughly
20 percent of total voters in 1994. This share is very stable in subsequent elections, as
the increase in the number of young treated individuals almost exactly compensates for
the reduction in the number of old treated ones. This back-of-the-envelope calculation
indicates that the extreme persistence of the effect of Mediaset is largely consistent with
the fact that the youngest and oldest cohorts, who spent more time watching TV in 1985,
were more influenced by Mediaset content.
Table A9: Distribution of voting population and implied effect of Mediaset by age group
and election (1994-2006)
1994 1996 2001 2006
share of voters 55 or older in 1985 (born on or before 1930) 0.208 0.182 0.123 0.082
share of voters below 10 in 1985 (born after 1975) 0.029 0.052 0.125 0.141
share of voters below 10 or 55 or older in 1985 0.237 0.234 0.248 0.224
implied effect of Mediaset on voting for Forza Italia 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.019
Note: The table reports the distribution of voting population and the implied effect of Mediaset on voting for Forza
Italia by age group for each election held between 1994 and 2006. The implied effect of Mediaset (last row) is computed by
multiplying the share of younger and older voters (first two rows) by the coefficients estimated for such age groups (reported
in the left graph of Figure 6).
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Appendix C Data on adult literacy and numeracy
test scores
Data on adult cognitive skills are available from the OECD Program for the Interna-
tional Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). PIAAC surveys were conducted in
32 countries over two rounds between 2008 and 2016 (a third round is currently ongoing).
In each country, 5,000 individuals, representative of the adult population between 16 and
65 years, were interviewed with the aim of assessing their level of literacy and numeracy
skills, as well as their ability to solve problems in technology-rich environments. Tests
were conducted in each country’s national language, but were standardized to allow for
cross-national comparison. Prior to the actual assessment, the interviewer would admin-
ister a background questionnaire, which would usually take between 30 and 45 minutes.
Depending on the respondents computer skills, the assessment could be performed either
in computer-based or paper-based format, and would on average take about 50 minutes.
In the computer-based version, the literacy and numeracy assessments had an adaptive
design, i.e., respondents were directed to more or less difficult blocks of questions based
on their performance in the previous ones, so that the final score would take into account
both the number of correct answers and the difficulty of the items answered. Overall score
in the literacy and numeracy tests ranges between 0 and 500. For ease of interpretation,
the score maps into six proficiency levels (from 0 to 5), each of which is described in terms
of the types of tasks adults can successfully complete (OECD, 2013; Clair, 2014). The PI-
AAC literacy tests ask respondents to answer questions about texts that are drawn from a
broad range of real life settings, including occupational, personal, community and educa-
tion contexts. The numeracy tests ask respondents to answer questions about quantities
and numbers, dimensions and shapes, patterns, relations, and changes. For our analysis
we use data from the assessments conducted in Italy in 2012 on a sample of 4,598 individ-
uals representative at the national level. We obtained access to a restricted-use version
of the data that includes information on respondents’ personal characteristics (i.e., age,
gender, educational attainment, marital status) and on their municipality of residence,
which allows us to assign to each respondent a level of Mediaset signal strength as of 1985.
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Appendix D Exposure to Mediaset and voluntary as-
sociations across municipalities.
In Table A10 we investigate the relationship between exposure to Mediaset prior to 1985
and the evolution of civic engagement between 1981 and 2001 across municipalities, as
measured by the number of civic associations. This is one of the measures of civic en-
gagement used by Putnam (2000), and the only available at the municipal level since the
1980s.
In particular, we compute the number of civic associations per capita in 1981, 1991
and 2001 from the national census. Reassuringly, signal strength in 1985 is not correlated
with the number of voluntarily associations in 1981, i.e. before the expansion of Mediaset
(column 1). The relation between the two variables becomes negative and statistically
significant after the introduction of Mediaset (columns 2 and 3). In column (4) we pool
observations for all census years and interact Signal with a dummy for the period after ex-
posure; we also include municipality fixed effects, thus exploiting only differential changes
over time within the same municipality. The coefficient of the interaction term suggests
that civic engagement declines in exposed municipalities, relative to other municipalities,
in the period after exposure.
These results corroborate the individual-level evidence presented in column (4) of
Table 8. The estimated effects are also quantitatively comparable: a one standard devi-
ation increase in Signal is associated with a fifth of a standard deviation decline in civic
engagement at the individual level, and a third of a standard deviation decline across
municipalities.
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Table A10: Exposure to Mediaset and voluntary associations across municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1981 1991 2001 diff-in-diff 1981-2001




Signal X Post-1985 -0.035 -0.035
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 7,519 7,503 7,503 22,768 22,768
Municipality-level controls YES YES YES NO NO
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.514 0.531 0.736 0.549 0.788
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on civic engagement across Italian
municipalities. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the number of voluntary associations per capita in 1981, 1991,
and 2001, respectively; in column (4), we pool all observations over the entire period. Signal is Mediaset signal strength
in 1985, the regressions in columns (1)-(3) also control for SignalFree, Area, Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Ruggedness, Log
income per capita, Education, and Population, whereas the regression in column (4) includes municipality fixed effects.
Regressions are weighted by municipality population in 1981. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the
electoral district level in columns (1)-(3) and at the municipality level in column (4).
Appendix E Data on politician language
We compare the rhetoric of Italian politicians and parties by computing indexes of lan-
guage simplicity on two types of text data: party manifestos and televised leaders’ inter-
ventions.
Party manifestos are issued by political parties to communicate their electoral platform
to voters, and have been widely used to infer parties’ ideological position (Gabel and
Huber, 2000). We obtained from the Manifesto Project Database the electoral manifestos
of all main parties running in Italian general elections since 1983. In particular, we select
all manifestos issued by parties before an election in which they reached at least 5% of
the votes. Table A11 reports the full list of parties and years included in our corpus.
Our final sample covers 34 electoral programs from 11 different parties over the period
1983-2013, for a total of roughly 650,000 words.
We code language simplicity using the Gulpease Index, which adapts the Flesch-
Kincaid index to the specific case of Italian language (Tonelli et al., 2012). The Flesch-
Kincaid Index assesses readability based on the average number of syllables per word and
the average number of words per sentence (Flesch, 1948; Kincaid et al., 1975). Longer
sentences are more likely to be complex, as more subordinate clauses and more preposi-
tional phrases mean more mental work for the reader. So the longer a sentence, the harder
it is to read. The same is true for words. The index ranges from 0 (lowest readability)
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to 100 (maximum readability). The main difference between the Flesch-Kincaid and the
Gulpease Index used for the analysis of Italian text is that the latter takes into account
the length of a word in characters rather than in syllables, which is more appropriate for
the case of Italian (Lucisano and Piemontese, 1988).
Turning to our second source of text data, we transcribed 43 televised interventions
and electoral debates involving 16 political leaders over the period 1989-2013. For the last
years of the First Republic (1989-1993), we transcribed all appearances by major political
leaders that we could find available in a digitized format (3 in total). For the following
years, we include appearances by the main political leaders of the Second Republic during
the three months preceding each election. The vast majority of interventions come from
“Porta a Porta”, the most popular political talk show in Italy, which started broadcasting
in January 1996. Table A12 reports the politicians appearing in each intervention, the
party they belonged to, the date and the name of the show, and an indicator for whether
politicians were debating with each other or not. The final corpus comprises over 55 hours
of footage and nearly 320,000 words.
When analyzing these text data, we can not use the Gulpease Index or other variations
of the Flesch-Kincaid because they are very sensitive to the choice of punctuation, which
is rather arbitrary when transcribing spoken language. For this reason, we compute
the ratio between the number of “simple” words, as defined by the Basic Vocabulary
of Italian (BVI), over the number of other words as an alternative measure of language
simplicity. The BVI, originally compiled by De Mauro and Vedovelli (1980), defines a set
of 6,690 high-frequency and high-availability ”simple” words that “are certainly known
to the generality of those who have attended school at least until the eighth grade”
(De Mauro and Vedovelli, 1980). Operationally, words are included in the BVI based
on their frequency in a large corpus of written and spoken Italian as well as on their
dispersion (i.e., the number of different texts in which they appear). Therefore, the BVI
provides a comprehensive picture of both written and spoken language. The share of
high-frequency general-service words is commonly used by linguists to measure language
complexity (see Laufer and Nation (1995) and Read (2000) for a comprehensive survey).
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Table A11: Available transcripts of Party Manifestos 1983-2013
Party Party Initials Years
Democratic Party PD 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013
Forza Italia FI 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013
Communist Refoundation Party RC 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001
Christian Democrats DC 1983, 1987, 1992
Italian Communist Party PCI 1983, 1987
Italian Socialist Party PSI 1983, 1987, 1992
Lega Nord LN 1994, 1996, 2008
Italian Popular Party PPI 1994, 1996
National Alliance AN 1994, 1996
The Daisy DL 2001
Five Star Movement M5S 2008
Note: the table reports the list of all available party manifestos between 1983 and 2013, for parties obtaining at least 5%
of vote in the corresponding election. The data are used for the text analysis in Section 6.5.




























  Berlusconi (FI) Grillo (M5S) Bersani (PD) Monti (Centre)
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Table A12: Available transcripts of TV debates, 1989-2013
Politician(s) Party Initials Month Year Program Debate
Craxi PSI May 1989 Mixer No
Andreotti DC January 1993 Mixer No
De Mita DC February 1993 Mixer No
Berlusconi FI January 1994 Mixer No
Berlusconi, Occhetto FI, PD February 1994 Braccio di Ferro Yes
Berlusconi, Prodi FI, PD April 1996 Testa a Testa Yes
D’Alema PD February 1996 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI May 2001 Porta a Porta No
Fassino, Fini PD, AN May 2001 Porta a Porta Yes
Rutelli DL May 2001 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI March 2006 Porta a Porta No
D’Alema, Fini PD, AN March 2006 Porta a Porta Yes
Prodi PD March 2006 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi, Prodi FI, PD April 2006 Porta a Porta Yes
Berlusconi, Fassino FI, PD June 2006 Porta a Porta Yes
Fini, Rutelli AN, DL June 2006 Porta a Porta Yes
Berlusconi FI February 2008 Porta a Porta No
Casini PPI February 2008 Porta a Porta No
D’Alema PD February 2008 Porta a Porta No
Veltroni PD February 2008 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI March 2008 Porta a Porta No
Bertinotti RC March 2008 Porta a Porta No
Bertinotti, Casini RC, PPI March 2008 Porta a Porta Yes
Casini PPI March 2008 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI April 2008 Porta a Porta No
Casini PPI April 2008 Porta a Porta No
Fini AN April 2008 Porta a Porta No
Veltroni PD April 2008 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI January 2013 Porta a Porta No
Bersani PD January 2013 Porta a Porta No
Monti SC January 2013 Porta a Porta No
Berlusconi FI February 2013 Porta a Porta No
Bersani PD February 2013 Porta a Porta No
Monti SC February 2013 Porta a Porta No
Grillo M5S May 2013 Porta a Porta No
Note: the table reports the list of televised interventions by top Italian politicians, carried out between 1989 and 2013,
used for the text analysis in Section 6.5. For each intervention we report: the name of the politician(s) that delivered the
speech, the party affiliation, the month, year and hosting program, and an indicator for whether the intervention was in the
context of a debate with another politician or not. The party initials refer to the following parties: PSI (Italian Socialist
Party); DC (Christian Democrats); FI (Forza Italia); PD (Democratic Party); AN (National Alliance); DL (The Daisy);
PPI (Italian Popular Party); RC (Communist Refoundation Party); SC (Civic Choice); M5S (Five Star Movement).
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